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a multidisciplinary group of researchers. They ana-
lyzed the origins and implications of social inequal-
ity	 from	different	 perspectives	 during	 a	week-long	
workshop	 in	May	 2016,	 sponsored	 by	 the	 Lorentz	
Center at Leiden University. The workshop and the 
publication of this book were also supported by a 
KNAW grant awarded to Naomi Ellemers. 
The essays and further content of this book were 
jointly prepared by the team of workshop organiz-
ers:	 Belle	 Derks,	 Naomi	 Ellemers,	 Félice	 Van	 Nun-
speet, Daan Scheepers, and Jojanneke Van der Toorn 
(in	alphabetical	order).	The	essays	are	based	on	dis-
cussions during the workshop provided by all partic-
ipants:	Neelke	Doorn,	Joseph	Heath,	Frank	Hindriks,	
Pauline Kleingeld, Kate Pickett, Madeleine Power, 
Sabine	Roeser,	Servaas	Storm,	Gwen	Van	Eijk,	Irene	
Van Staveren, and Richard Wilkinson. Their expert 
contributions are not only included in the arguments 
put forth in the essays, but also in personalized text 
boxes	elaborating	specific	points.	The	statistics	and	
graphs, as well as the list of annotated references 
and reading suggestions also are the product of their 
collective contributions. 
We gratefully acknowledge the support from the 
Lorentz Center, in particular Eline Pollaert who took 
care of all practicalities. Leon Hilbert and Lisa van Es 
provided valuable assistance during the workshop. 
Piet	Groot	 supported	us	 throughout	 the	project	 in	
collecting and organizing all materials. Marjolijn Voo-
gel from AUP enthusiastically helped us envision and 






Belle Derks is Professor of Social and Organization-
al Psychology at Utrecht University. She studies how 
women and ethnic minorities in work and educa-
tional	settings	are	affected	by	negative	stereotypes,	
and what they themselves and organizations can do 
to maintain their motivation, ambition and perfor-
mance. 
Neelke Doorn is Associate professor of Ethics and 
Philosophy of Technology at the Technical Universi-
ty	Delft.	Her	research	concentrates	on	moral	issues	
in risk governance, with a special focus on environ-
mental risks and water security. 
Naomi Ellemers is a social psychologist and Distin-
guished University Professor at Utrecht University. 
She studies how membership of social groups im-
pacts upon individual outcomes. In her recent work 
she	 specifically	 focuses	 on	 the	 impact	 of	morality	
and moral motivation. 
Joseph Heath is Professor in the Department of 
Philosophy	and	the	School	of	Public	Policy	and	Gov-
ernance at the University of Toronto. He has worked 
extensively	in	the	field	of	critical	theory,	philosophy	
and economics, practical rationality, distributive jus-
tice, and business ethics.
Frank Hindriks is Professor of Ethics, Social and 
Political	Philosophy	at	the	University	of	Groningen.	
The main theme of his research is moral responsibil-
ity, investigating the attribution of praise and blame, 
and how people employ rationalizations to disavow 
responsibility. 
Pauline Kleingeld is Professor of Philosophy at the 
University	of	Groningen.	Her	 expertise	 centres	on	
moral theory, Immanuel Kant and Kantian ethics, 
practical reason, and philosophical cosmopolitan-
ism.
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Kate Pickett is Professor of Epidemiology at the 
University of York, the University’s Research Cham-
pion for Justice & Equality, and a Trustee of The 
Equality Trust. Her research focuses on the social 
determinants of health and health inequalities, in 
particular the links between income inequality, well-
being and sustainability.
Madeleine Power is a researcher in public health, 
working on health inequalities and food insecurity in 
the UK. She trained in social and political sciences at 
Cambridge and social policy at the London School 
of	 Economics	 and	 Political	 Science	 (LSE),	 and	 has	
experience of conducting quantitative and qualita-
tive research in third-sector research organizations.
Sabine Roeser is Distinguished Antoni van Leeu-
wenhoek Professor and head of the Ethics and Phi-
losophy	of	Technology	Section	at	the	Delft	Univer-
sity	of	Technology.	Her	research covers	theoretical,	
foundational topics concerning the nature of moral 
knowledge, intuitions, emotions and evaluative as-
pects of risk.
Daan Scheepers is Associate professor of Social 
and Organizational Psychology at Leiden Universi-
ty. His research centres on group processes, inter-
group	 relations	 (the	 psychology	 of	 ‘us	 and	 them’),	
threat, and identity.
Servaas Storm is Assistant professor of Economics 
of Technology and Innovation at the Technical Uni-
versity	 Delft.	 He	 works	 on	macro-economics,	 (in-
duced)	technological	progress,	 income	distribution	
and	 economic	 growth,	 finance,	 development	 and	
structural change, and climate change. 
Gwen Van Eijk is Assistant professor of Crimi-
nology at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. She 
studies	how	crime	control	reflects	and	shapes	class	
inequality. 
Félice Van Nunspeet is Assistant professor of So-
cial and Organizational Psychology at Utrecht Uni-
versity.	 She	 uses	 (implicit)	 behavioural	 and	 neuro-
biological	measures	 –	 such	 as	 EEG	 and	 fMRI	 –	 to	
study	why	and	how	people	adhere	to	moral	(group)	
norms, and which cognitive processes are associat-
ed with this motivation. 
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Irene Van Staveren is an economist and Profes-
sor at the International Institute of Social Studies 
of Erasmus University Rotterdam. Her expertise is 
in the intersection of economics and ethics, in par-
ticular on issues of inequality such as gender gaps, 
poverty, and the global divide between rich and 
poor countries.
Jojanneke Van der Toorn is Professor of Lesbian, 
Gay,	Bisexual	and	Transgender	Workplace	Inclusion	
at Leiden University, and Assistant Professor in So-
cial and Organizational Psychology at Utrecht Uni-
versity. She studies diversity in society and organiza-
tions and mainly focuses on the social psychological 
mechanisms involved in how, why, and when people 
resist, provide support for, or directly engage in so-
cial change.
Richard Wilkinson is Professor Emeritus of Social 
Epidemiology at the University of Nottingham Med-
ical School, Honorary Professor at University Col-
lege London and Visiting Professor at the University 
of York. He has played a formative role in interna-
tional research on the social determinants of health 
and	on	the	societal	effects	of	income	inequality.
‘Income inequality is the “defining challenge of our time”. … we … trust our 
institutions less (and) trust each other less when there’s greater inequality’  
	 President	Barack	Obama	(December	4,	2013)
‘Inequality is the root of social ills.’ 
	 Pope	Francis	(November	24,	2013)
‘… the economics profession (has) downplayed inequality for too long. 
Now all of us have a better understanding that a more equal distribution 
of income allows for more economic stability, more sustained economic 
growth, and healthier societies with stronger bonds of cohesion and trust.’ 
	 Christine	Lagarde,	Director,	IMF	(January	23,	2013)
‘Social and economic inequalities can tear the social fabric, undermine social 
cohesion and prevent nations from thriving. Inequality can breed crime, 






Life is unfair. In many large cities, opulent homes can be 
found right alongside poor neighbourhoods. The new medi-
cines that pharmaceutical companies develop are so expen-
sive	that	many	people	can’t	afford	to	use	them.	And	while	




ers, people feel unsafe because they fear being burgled. Ice 
rinks are constructed in the middle of deserts for the enter-
tainment of some. Yet many others are helpless in the face 
of natural disasters that destroy their homes and endanger 
the provision of food. 
We can all see that social inequality exists and that it creates 






What happens when two children have to share a 
cookie? It depends. Chances of getting an equal di-
vision are best when one child divides the cookie 
and the other is allowed to choose first. This is less 
likely to happen when one child divides the cookie 
and gives part of it away. This example illustrates the 
point of a famous thought experiment designed by 
philosopher John Rawls to explain the ‘veil of igno-
rance’. Imagine that no one knows what his or her 
preferences, abilities or position in society will be –
because this is covered by a veil of ignorance– what 
kind of society would we want to live in? 
This thought experiment invites us to think about 
fairness, equality and justice. Those who choose to 
have a society that is very hard on people with few 
abilities or who are born into a group with a low so-
cial status, might suffer if they happen to end up as 
someone with few abilities or belonging to a low-sta-
tus group. This way of thinking thus helps us trans-
form self-interest into general interest. A similar prin-
ciple underlies insurances: everybody contributes an 
equal share, not knowing who will be the one need-
ing a smaller or larger payment or nothing at all. This 
justice principle can be threatened when insurances 
refuse to accept people who are considered high risk 
(e.g., because they suffer from a chronic illness), or 
give discounts to those who are unlikely to undergo 
costly medical treatments (e.g., students).
different	outcomes	simply	reflect	differences	in	capabilities	
and priorities? Do they result from diverging choices? Is it a 
matter of chance that some people are lucky while others 
suffer	misfortune?	 So	 are	 some	 people	 often	 lucky	while	
others encounter misfortune every time? How can this be? 




ticians. Scholars who engage in this debate tend to address 
specific	issues,	or	only	consider	their	own	disciplinary	per-
spective. With all these competing analyses being put forth, 
it is easy to lose heart and conclude that the origins of social 
inequality are so complex that a solution is out of our reach.
We thus tend to close our eyes to the inequality that exists, 
because we don’t see how it could be resolved. We assume 
it	does	not	matter	what	we	do;	we	hope	that	things	will	be	
sorted out in the end, or we trust others to take care of 
them. These are all missed opportunities. We need to ac-
knowledge the problems we face before we can address 
them, for they will not be resolved by themselves. If we do 
nothing, things will only get worse. Because it truly matters 
what we do – or fail to do.
How?
This book aims to shed new light on the debate on social in-




equality. We brought together academic experts from a vari-
ety of disciplines to examine this issue in depth. Throughout 
the	book,	we	take	a	moral	perspective	 (see	Box	1.1):	What	
is fair? What kind of world do we want to live in? By taking 
these questions as our starting point and combining knowl-
edge	 from	different	academic	disciplines,	we	evaluate	 the	
conceptions held by the public against scholarly knowledge 
in order to separate facts from myths. 
This book captures our collective insights in an integrated 
analysis. The consequences of social inequality are made 
visible in photographs and statistics, because we have to 
face reality, however unpleasant it may be, instead of turn-
ing a blind eye. In this book we explain why many measures 
are	not	particularly	effective,	and	draw	on	scientific	knowl-
edge to elucidate what kinds of solutions are necessary 
and feasible. 
Resolving social inequality seems a daunting task, because 
it	touches	upon	different	areas	of	life.	When	we	think	about	
social	 inequality,	we	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 differences	 be-
tween people, for instance in income and living standards. 
But	such	differences	are	closely	 linked	to	other	 important	
life	outcomes	 (see	Box	 1.2),	 such	as	health	and	 life	expec-
tancy or educational level and career opportunities. Social 
differences	also	play	a	role	on	a	larger	scale,	for	example	in	
the movements and absorption of migrants, or in the way 
we use our natural habitat and deal with ecological hazards.
We tend to think that inequalities in different areas – 
in health, education, or opportunities for children – 
are separate problems. They are often discussed as 
injustices requiring different remedial policies. But 
although many policies which would improve health 
would make little difference to education and vice 
versa, it is essential to recognise that most of the 
problems routed in relative deprivation also share 
some powerful common causes. 
Most of the problems which within any society are 
more common lower down the social ladder, get 
worse when differences in income and wealth be-
tween rich and poor get larger. Basically, problems 
related to social status get worse when social status 
differences get bigger. As a result, countries with wid-
er income gaps between rich and poor have higher 
rates of a range of social problems (such as homi-
cide rates and level of mental illness) compared with 
more equal countries (see Figure 2). 
This pattern is partly explained by the way bigger in-
come differences increase the scale of relative dep-
rivation. But although inequality has its biggest ef-
fects among the poorest, it leads to worse outcomes 
across all sections of society.  That is because bigger 
income differences make class and status – social po-
sition – more important throughout society. Those 
with lower status are eager to climb, and those with 
higher status are fearful to lose their status. Status 
anxiety increases in all income groups and, as status 
competition increases, social relations, community 







popular solutions. We critically assess what tends to be 
seen as the main cause of social inequality, and what kind of 
solution this seems to require. Is this analysis well founded? 
Are the explanations commonly put forth substantiated by 
scientific	 facts,	or	 are	 they	myths	 that	must	be	debunked	
before we can tackle the real causes of inequality?
Myths and facts
Myth 1: Economic growth is always good. 
A growing economy creates many opportunities. This is 
most clearly visible when the starting point is highly unfa-
vourable. In developing countries, for instance, economic 
growth can improve access to food, education, and health 
care. But where such basic provisions are already available, 
further	 economic	 growth	 can	 also	 have	 negative	 effects.	
There	are	often	costs	associated	with	economic	growth;	for	
example, because natural resources are depleted or harm is 
done to the environment. A singular focus on increasing a 
country’s	Global	Domestic	Product	(GDP)	can	easily	over-
look this. In various countries, including the Netherlands, 
increases	 in	 GDP	 per	 capita	 do	 not	 necessarily	 improve	





Morality matters to how people decide what to do. 
This is to a large extent because people have a desire 
to act in accordance with the moral norms they have 
adopted. And they are prone to notice discrepancies 
between what they want to do and their moral norms. 
In spite of this, people often end up acting in harmful 
or otherwise immoral ways. How can this be?
Even though virtually everybody engages in moral 
reasoning, people often do so in a self-serving man-
ner. When they are tempted to do something harm-
ful, they find ways of justifying the action to them-
selves, or to excuse or exonerate themselves. How 
can it be wrong to take home office supplies when 
‘everybody is doing it’? Sexual harassment is often 
justified in terms of the clothing someone wears, i.e. 
by ‘blaming the victim’. Engaging in military combat 
becomes significantly easier when civilian casualties 
are euphemistically labelled as ‘collateral damage’. 
Where do things go wrong? Morality matters in that 
people register moral discrepancies and often feel 
guilty already prior to performing a harmful action. 
Ideally, people subsequently refrain from performing 
this action and change their plans so as to conform 
to their norms. When, however, this is not the case, 
they may arrive at the conclusion that, in spite of ap-
pearances, it is permitted to act in the preferred man-
ner. What is particularly striking about such self-serv-
ing moral reasoning is that, as a consequence, people 
rarely believe of their own actions that they are bad. 
In this way, as the psychologist Albert Bandura fa-
mously noted, people are able to ‘behave harmfully 
and still live in peace with themselves’.






































most from economic growth, while this is rarely the case 
for those with little wealth and few opportunities. Without 
policies that level out such discrepancies, economic growth 
can easily induce greater inequality, which in turn is linked 
to	a	number	of	negative	societal	outcomes	(see	Figure	2).	
In	its	2014	report	‘Off	the	Deep	End’,	the	Institute	for	Policy	
Studies noted that income disparities in the US increased 
during the recovery from the most recent economic crisis. 
On Wall Street, bonuses were already the same as or even 
higher than before the crisis, while the minimum wage in 
the US had remained unchanged in all those years. Clearly, 
not	everyone	benefited	from	the	economic	recovery.	
Nowadays, more and more people are aware of these facts. 
And yet economic and social policies are still based on the 
implicit assumption that economic growth is always good. 
Hence, it is commonly believed that we should support 
companies and people that can ensure growth, for exam-
ple by allowing tax exemptions or by supporting them with 
taxpayers’ money.
Why is the myth of economic growth so persistent? Of 
course, in a growing economy it is easier to maintain that 
everyone	will	be	better	off	in	the	end.	This	allows	us	to	ig-
nore the fact that there is a small segment of the population 
that	clearly	benefits	most	from	a	growing	economy.	Those	
who insist that growth is always good are in fact justifying 
Source: Netherlands beyond GDP: A Wellbeing Index. Institutions for 
Open Societies, Utrecht University and Rabobank Economic Research. 
December 21, 2016.
Figure 1




BW index includes indicators of 11 dimensions 
indicating the state of health, safety, environment, 
education, income, employment and working hours, 
housing, civic and community engagement, following 
OECD taxonomy of better life index.
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economic	 choices	 that	 leave	many	people	worse	off	 (see	
Box	1.3).	
Myth 2: Equal rights provide equal opportunities.
Legally anchoring equal rights and enforcing such laws can 
help	to	curb	 inequality,	but	 it	 is	only	a	first	step.	Providing	
equal rights does not mean that people actually enjoy equal 
opportunities.
Factors such as social class, gender, and ethnicity all play 
a role in the opportunities that people get, regardless of 
their abilities, rights, or choices. When we assess people’s 
accomplishments,	we	may	 form	 different	 expectations	 of	
their strengths and weaknesses merely because they look 
or	speak	differently	than	we	do.	We	do	this	unintentionally	
and	often	unwittingly.	Yet	 it	 can	have	 far-reaching	effects.	
This has repeatedly been demonstrated in studies where 
identical letters and CVs were submitted in response to a 




We assess the ambitions and achievement potential of dif-
ferent	 individuals	 differently,	 simply	 because	of	who	 they	
are	 and	 where	 they	 come	 from.	 These	 first	 impressions	
make	us	more	willing	 to	 give	 some	people	 the	benefit	of	







































































Source: Wilkinson & Pickett, The Spirit Level (2009)
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We generally tend to seek, consider, and remember infor-
mation	 that	 confirms	our	first	 impressions.	This	makes	 it	
difficult	for	people	to	prove	their	actual	worth,	especially	if	
the	first	impression	we	have	of	them	is	not	very	favourable.
Those who belong to a group that has had little success in 
society are also disadvantaged in another way. Success not 
only	reflects	the things you can do but also depends on the 
people you know. It is easier to show your worth when you 
know someone who can introduce you to relevant decision 
makers.	It	is	much	more	difficult	to	convince	others	of	your	
qualities if there is no one to show you the way or help you 
get started. The formal right to equal treatment does not 
compensate for this.
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The economist John Maynard Keynes wrote in 1936 
that economics is a moral science. But today, most 
economists regard their discipline as value-free and 
objective. This view is defended with the distinction 
between economic analysis and economic policy 
implications: the second is considered moral, con-
cerned with what ought to be, whereas the first is 
considered neutral, concerned with models, calcula-
tions, and statistical data. Economists working in the 
tradition of Keynes or other traditions outside the 
mainstream disagree with this view. We claim that 
economic analysis is not nor can be morally neutral. 
First, economists are not morally neutral: recent re-
search has shown that political attitudes of econo-
mists relate to the type of research they do and the 
policy advice they provide. 
Second, the evaluative criterion used for markets is 
efficiency. This is a moral value and is concerned with 
the minimization of waste. The exclusive focus on effi-
ciency implies neglect of other values such as equali-
ty, security or sustainability. 
Third, mainstream economics assumes that all eco-
nomic agents strive to maximize their individual 
utility. This implies an exclusive focus on maximum 
outcomes with minimum use of inputs, which should 
lead to efficiency in a fully competitive market con-
text. This approach is limited because it does not 
allow for redistribution between agents in order to 
maximize aggregate utility. 
Fourth, real-world economic agents often do not 
maximize utility – they either follow certain moral 
principles and social norms, or they make choices 
following emotions, instincts, or instructions. 
Fifth, there is increasing evidence showing that effi-
ciency and equality are not trade-offs but that a more 
equal distribution of resources tends to improve ef-
ficiency. Hence, policies such as free education or af-
fordable health care insurance for all, benefit human 
capital and labour productivity. This leads to higher 
levels of income and wellbeing, which is regarded as 
efficient by economists of all types, and can be ex-
pressed in terms of GDP growth.
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Myth 3: People only change when this benefits their self-
interest.
Attempts	 to	 influence	 human	behaviour	 are	 often	 guided	
by the assumption that people pursue economic gain. For 
instance, our strong faith in the blessings of the free market 
is based on the notion that people make rational choices 
aiming	to	maximize	their	profits.	Government	policies	rely	
on	financial	 incentives	 and	 sanctions	 to	 influence	 compa-
nies and organizations. Managers at these companies and 
organizations rely on similar mechanisms in guiding the 
behaviour of citizens, clients, and employees. All these par-
ties are treated as separate individuals who rationally try to 




The implicit assumption that people are self-interested in-
dividuals who are primarily driven by the pursuit of prof-




in this way. It is assumed that the opportunity to earn more 
money	offers	an	important	incentive	for	people	to	seek	em-
ployment. But is this the only reason why people work? If 
it were, how could we explain why so many people free-
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ly	donate	their	time	and	efforts	to	do	volunteer	work?	The	
importance of high earnings is also cited to justify top sala-
ries in the corporate world. If the pay were not competitive 
– so it is argued – the most talented workers would move 
abroad. Yet we see that many talented people are reluctant 
to move to another country because they value other as-
pects of life, such as the national culture or their ties with 
family and friends. These examples show it is too easy to 
assume	 that	people	always	 seek	economic	profit	and	will	
do anything to achieve this. 
At the same time, we know that there are important draw-
backs to motivating people in this way. Research has estab-
lished that the use of competitive incentive schemes and 
performance systems elicits untruthful reporting of perfor-
mance	results	and	misbehaviour.	The	prospect	of	financial	
gain is also seen as an important root cause in recent cases 
of	large-scale	fraud,	such	as	the	diesel-emissions	software	
scandal	or	the	fixing	of	LIBOR	interest	rates	in	banking.
What, then, would be a viable alternative to approach-
es	based	on	economic	profit	maximization?	Why	do	peo-
ple change their behaviour if this brings them no material 
gain? Research reveals that there are other factors besides 
self-interest and rational choices that guide people’s behav-
iour. For instance, the choices they make are also informed 
by their identity, by the emotions they experience, or by the 
motivation	to	do	what	 is	morally	right	 (see	Box	1.5).	 In	dif-
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ferent studies, the desire for equality emerges as a relevant 
concern. Common interests, similar goals, shared values 
and experiences, and empathy and care for each other are 
all strong motives that can lead people to transcend their 
own interests. In fact, a basic behavioural motive is implied 
in the need to belong and to be respected and valued by 
others	 who	 are	 important	 to	 the	 self	 (see	 also	 Box	 4.4).	
Empathy and care are also important drivers of human be-
haviour.	People	are	willing	to	make	all	kinds	of	sacrifices	to	
achieve	such	goals,	often	acting	in	ways	that	seem	to	make	
little sense or appear to be irrational. In order to under-
stand this kind of behaviour, we must take into account that 
people cannot simply be considered individual actors who 
act	rationally	to	maximize	their	own	benefits.	They	are	also	
social animals who look to each other for respect, support, 
and guidance.
Myth 4: Social unrest only reflects discontent over personal 
outcomes. 
We live in an era of social unrest. Young people are eager to 
find	work	and	to	have	their	own	home,	but	they	are	unable	
to support themselves. Migrants abandon everything they 
know and love in search of a better future. They end up in 
countries where people worry whether there are enough 
employment and housing opportunities for all. No wonder, 
then, that people rise up in protest.
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1.5
Convincing people to change their moral 
behaviour 
Naomi Ellemers and Félice Van Nunspeet 
Research shows that people have a strong motiva-
tion to consider themselves as moral persons. They 
try to do what they consider morally right, also if 
this means that they have to abandon their person-
al preferences. The desire to be moral is a very im-
portant motive –people attempt to do what is moral, 
even when they know this will make them seem less 
friendly or less smart.
The drawback of this desire is that people find it aver-
sive to consider the ways in which their behaviour 
may be lacking in morality. When we monitor their 
brain activity, we see that people carefully attend to 
their moral lapses. When we consider their physio-
logical stress responses we see that they are quite 
upset by their moral shortcomings. Yet when we ask 
them to explain what they did, they tend to justify 
their behaviour, or deny its moral implications. Why?
Precisely because they care so deeply about being 
moral, confronting people with their moral short-
comings easily induces a sense of threat and raises 
defensive responses. Hence, insisting that their be-
haviour is lacking in morality may not be the most 
productive way to get people to change. It only makes 
them unhappy, hostile, and defensive.
How can we use this knowledge to convince people 
to change their moral behaviour? Feelings of threat 
are alleviated when people are explicitly invited to 
improve their moral behaviour. Asking them to focus 
on the moral ideals and possible solutions to achieve 
these, helps them engage and plan for ways to be 
more effective in doing what they consider to be 
morally right. 
Further, people are most likely to do what is moral 
when their behaviour is monitored by others who 
are important to them. They hope to earn respect 
and social inclusion by acting in ways that are morally 
approved by these others.
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On the surface, it would seem that the forces driving social 
unrest and political protest relate to people’s frustrations 
about their own outcomes and prospects in life. For exam-
ple, the people who joined the ‘Occupy Wall Street’ move-
ment described themselves as ‘the 99 per cent’. This was 
intended to emphasize the distinction between the majority 
of people and the richest one per cent in the US, who earn 
disproportionately more than the rest. 
But other indications suggest that income disparities are 
not the main reason that people revolt. Indeed, the Occupy 
movement	was	not	only	directed	at	differences	in	income,	
but also at the disproportionate influence that the richest 
one per cent have on politics. People protested against the 
fact that the interests, wishes, and preferences of such a 
small group dictate the systems we develop (or fail to de-
velop)	to	work	together,	live	together,	and	show	solidarity	in	
caring	for	each	other.	Even	those	who	benefit	from	current	
arrangements can see that for many people, the system is 
not	working.	The	protests	that	are	voiced	also	reflect	such	
broader concerns and moral ideals. 
A case in point is the attitude towards migrants. Countering 
common beliefs, research shows that the reluctance to ac-
commodate more migrants is not primarily driven by individu-




Why is it so difficult to reduce social inequality? 
Research has addressed the role of (physiological) 
threat implied by the prospect of change. 
This work shows that when power differences are 
stable, the powerless show signs of threat. They dis-
play a maladaptive pattern of high blood pressure, 
accompanied by high vascular resistance, and low 
cardiac performance. When power differences are 
unstable, similar threat is shown by those in power. 
This helps to explain why people in power may be 
reluctant to reduce social inequality. For them, social 
change implies losing their privileged position.
These dynamics not only play out at the individual 
level, but also at the group level. They are visible not 
only when ‘real’ material resources are at stake but 
also when status differences are more symbolic. 
This is not always evident from what people say. 
Physiological signs of threat to unstable status rela-
tions may emerge even among those who endorse 




egalitarian views. For instance, when discussing 
changing gender roles in society, males showed in-
creased blood pressure, especially when discussing 
this with a woman. However, under these circum-
stances their endorsement of explicit sexist state-
ments was reduced. Thus surface level openness to 
social change can co-occur with the experience of 
threat, which may impede the propensity to engage 
in real action towards changing gender roles.
Is there hope? Research shows that members of 
dominant groups can become positively engaged 
by the prospect of social change. Both their explicit 
attitudes and their physiological responses indicate 
they feel positively challenged by the possibility 
of change, provided that they see such change as 
a moral ideal, rather than as a moral obligation. 
Emphasizing the moral ideals underlying the desire 








grants will call into question moral values that are important 
to them, and will alter the principles that govern society. In 
developed countries, more abstract concerns such as these 
constitute	the	main	cause	of	social	unrest	(see	also	Figure	7).
From problems to solutions
Although having some form of social inequality is inevitable, 
it is still worth considering the causes of such inequality, as 
well as its consequences. Once we recognize that common-
ly	held	assumptions	are	 in	 fact	myths,	we	gain	a	different	
perspective. Taking a novel perspective to examine famil-
iar	problems	yields	a	different	 level	of	understanding	and	
brings to the fore other types of solutions. 
Debunking	common	myths	is	important;	it	causes	us	to	ask	
different	questions	and	to	examine	novel	solutions.	
If economic growth is not the silver bullet that many people 
consider it to be, we need to look further. This allows us to 
examine	what	choices	are	actually	being	justified	by	prior-
itizing economic growth. Who is rooting for this, and why? 
We	have	also	argued	that	equal	rights	only	constitute	a	first	
step towards creating equal opportunities. If this is the case, 
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Morality and unjust inequality
Neelke Doorn and Pauline Kleingeld
1.7
This book takes a moral perspective on social ine-
quality. This prompts the immediate question what 
morality is. Morality refers to the set of most fun-
damental rules and values that provide guidance 
on how one ought to act. Different ethical theories 
take different points of departure to articulate the 
relevant criteria. According to some theories, the 
criterion for right action is formulated in terms of 
the outcomes of one’s actions; according to others, 
what matters most is that one acts on the right un-
derlying principles. The first type of theory is called 
‘consequentialist’, the second ‘deontological’. For 
consequentialist theories, an act is considered right 
if it leads to better overall outcomes, for example if 
the well-being of people improves. In a deontological 
framework, an act is right if it is in accordance with 
a good principle or an appropriate value. Although 
consequentialist and deontological theories are 
fundamentally different, they may overlap when it 
comes to concrete duties. For example, leading con-
sequentialist and deontological theories hold that 
individuals have a moral duty to help people in need 
and to promote general well-being.
Both consequentialist and deontological theories 
may consider social inequality as undesirable or 
wrong. From a consequentialist perspective, if re-
ducing inequality improves the total amount of 
well-being, inequality should be reduced. From a 
deontological perspective, reducing inequality may 
be required because equality itself is considered of 
value, for example, or because an equal distribution 
is considered more fair. Not all moral theorists regard 
all forms of social inequality as necessarily unjust, 
since some inequalities may be the result of genuine-
ly voluntary decisions (for example, a personal pref-
erence to adopt a minimalist lifestyle). Thus, morality 
requires us to reduce unjust inequalities. This book 
explores what different inequalities may be at stake 






ent outcomes to individual choices and achievements – as 
we	so	often	do.		
And	 if	 people	 not	 only	 seek	 to	 differentiate	 themselves	
from others, but also have the desire to belong, this may be 
used to help them change their behaviour. 
Finally,	it	helps	to	know	that	social	unrest	also	reflects	peo-
ple’s anxieties about the threat they experience to the val-
ues that are important to them, and to the moral principles 
they endorse. This knowledge implies that we should not 
consider economic outcomes alone, but that we also need 
to reassure people about the moral implications of current 
developments in society. 
The structure of this book
The chapters in this book address the causes and conse-
quences	of	social	inequality	by	taking	an	often-overlooked	
perspective that goes beyond individualistic economic ap-
proaches. We view individuals as part of a collective or as 
members of a social group. We also consider the possibility 
that some groups have an interest in the maintenance of 
social	inequality,	while	others	aim	to	reduce	it	(see	Box	1.6).	
In performing this exercise, we examine the added value of 
taking a moral perspective. Key questions are whether peo-
ple are treated equally, and if not, whether we can arrive at 
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a more equitable distribution by using the power of moral 
arguments	–	i.e.,	the	desire	to	do	the	right	thing	(see	Box	1.7).
The	first	two	chapters	focus	on	the	novel	 insight	this	per-
spective yields into the way in which inequality impacts 
on education and work.	We	 also	 consider	 the	 effects	 that	
inequality can have on our health. The inequality between 
various groups in society is discussed in the chapter on mi-
gration.	In	the	final	chapter,	we	examine	how	taking	a	moral	
perspective changes the way we consider the inequality be-
tween	different	parts	of	the	world	with	regard	to	the	causes	
and	effects	of	climate change. 
For each of these subjects, we examine the added value of 
taking a moral perspective. When each of us pursues our 
own interests, this does not make the world a better place 
for everyone. Increasing the inequalities between people 
living	together	in	the	same	society	carries	significant	costs	
and	introduces	risks	that	affect	us	all.	We	examine	the	im-
plicit mechanisms that play a role in this process. In turn, 
these illustrate that the use of economic incentives that 
make people optimize their own outcomes does not re-
solve	the	problems	identified	here.	The	only	way	to	combat	
social inequality is to recognize that opportunities are not 
the same for everyone. Only when we ask ourselves how 
we can ensure that everyone is treated fairly can we begin 
to understand what we need to do.
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Jojanneke Van der Toorn
Education and work
2
Inequality in the labour force has many faces. Ethnic minor-
ities	find	it	more	difficult	than	ethnic	majorities	to	get	jobs,	
and are overrepresented in low-paying sectors. Women 
struggle to advance to higher positions at work, and on av-
erage still earn much less than men for doing the same work 




people and people with a functional impairment remains 
under-utilized;	 and	 sexual	 minorities	 feel	 less	 included	 in	
the	 workplace	 than	 heterosexuals.	 These	 kinds	 of	 differ-
ences can also be seen in education. Ethnic minorities and 
children from lower socio-economic backgrounds perform 
less well than their counterparts from higher socio-eco-
nomic backgrounds and are less likely to move on to higher 
education.	Girls	are	less	likely	to	be	trained	in	technical	pro-
fessions. And those who believe that measures designed to 
40
Pay differences
Irene Van Staveren 
2.1
Why do some people earn so much more than oth-
ers? The difference is due to several factors. Firstly, 
we tend to think that people should be compensated 
for the additional time and effort invested in training; 
if you go to school longer, your subsequent income 
should reflect the income you were not able to earn 
during that time. However, many professions earn 
wages that are disproportional to these opportunity 
costs. A second factor relates to the supply and de-
mand for certain jobs. Due to socialization, expec-
tations, and pre-selection into stereotypical educa-
tional fields, labour markets are segmented leaving 
some groups with a very narrow choice of jobs and 
few career opportunities. For example, the majority 
of working women in most countries can be found 
in just three jobs: teacher, nurse and secretary. This 
oversupply pushes the wages down in these pro-
fessions. A third factor relates to artificially created 
scarcity. Various top-professions have limited supply 
due to rationing in the educational system, for exam-
ple by setting a limit to the number of students al-
lowed in medical school, or due to professional entry 
barriers, for example by enforcing a bar exam to be-
come a lawyer. A fourth factor has to do with status 
differences between job types. High status jobs tend 
to have high earnings, which are not clearly justified 
by the underlying productivity. For example, Beyon-
cé makes many times more money than an equally 
talented singer who works the same hours, but who 
simply has not made it and sings in small clubs for 
a meagre income. This is referred to as the ‘winner-
takes-all effect’, whereby the majority of earnings 
accrue to those at the top and little is left for others. 
Even though the relationship between effort and la-
bour output is weak, we do not question pay differ-
ences between people. Instead, we admire the rich 
and blame the poor, thus justifying inequality.
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empower these disadvantaged groups have been reversing 
these	 trends	are	 in	 for	 a	 rude	awakening:	 social	 and	eco-
nomic inequalities between these groups is growing within 
different	societies	across	the	entire	world.
Individual responsibility and the ‘business case’
In the public debate on social inequality, it is widely recog-
nized that inequality in education and work occurs along 
group lines. Newspapers are full of reports on the unequal 
outcomes between groups in society such as the glass ceil-
ing, the wage gap, and ethnic minorities’ lack of success 
in the labour market. But the explanations given for these 
forms of inequality tend to focus on the individual. We are 
inclined to look for the causes of inequality in the personal 
choices, qualities, and behaviour of those who are disad-
vantaged. Some people argue that ethnic minorities are un-
motivated, do not speak the language well, or do not have 
the	 right	 qualifications,	 and	 that	 women	 lack	 leadership	
skills or prioritize the family. In this way, individuals are held 
responsible for their group’s deprivation.
An	often-heard	argument	is	that	these	people	could	achieve	
anything if they really wanted to, because nothing stands 
in	 their	way.	This	 reflects	our	 strong	belief	 in	 society	as	a	
‘meritocracy’ in which each individual’s social position is de-




Myth of equal opportunities
Gwen	Van	Eijk 
One argument to justify existing social inequality is 
that opportunities for socioeconomic success and 
mobility are equal for all. Unequal outcomes would 
reflect different efforts: everyone in principle has 
the same starting point, but some work harder than 
others and end up earning more income, for exam-
ple, than others who work less hard. This argument 
is grounded in a belief that our society is meritocratic: 
people are rewarded based on their merits, not their 
social background. We find such beliefs in cultural 
narratives about, for example, the ‘American Dream’ 
and stories that express admiration for the ‘self-made 
man’ and those who make it ‘from rags to riches.’ 
However, such beliefs and narratives obscure the 
fact that opportunities are not equally distributed. 
Opportunities for socioeconomic success and mo-
bility still partly depend on the socioeconomic status 
of people’s parents (e.g. their occupational, educa-
tional or income level). Children of higher-educated 
and higher-earning parents on average do better 
than children of lower-educated and lower-earning 
parents. Parents who have more education, income 
and other valuable resources are able to invest more 
or in different ways in their children, in such a way 
that benefits their socioeconomic achievement. In-
tergenerational mobility is more limited and the role 
of class is more pronounced than we tend to think. 
Thus, inequality in outcomes is related to inequality 
in opportunities, not only in very unequal societies 
such as the United States but also in relatively egal-
itarian societies such as the Netherlands. Studies 
furthermore show that intergenerational mobility 
is more difficult in more unequal countries (this has 
been called ‘The Great Gatsby Curve’), and that mo-
bility becomes more difficult when inequality in a 
country increases because people from underprivi-
leged backgrounds have to overcome more barriers 
to gain socioeconomic success.
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of their lives and that factors such as ethnicity, gender, or 
sexual preference play little or no role in this. This way of 
thinking	reflects	a	strong	belief	in	the	possibility	of	moving	
up	in	the	world	(‘from	newspaper	boy	to	millionaire!’).	We	
prefer to believe this because it allows us to be proud of our 
own achievements if things are going well, and to remain 
hopeful for a better future if things are not going well. But 
the downside of this is that people who are less success-
ful get the blame for their lack of success. Do you have a 
low-paying job? Then you probably made the wrong choic-
es in life and did not do your best at school.
Likewise, when it comes to solutions, the arguments are 
often	based	on	 this	way	of	 thinking	 in	 terms	of	 individual	
choices and responsibilities. The Dutch prime minister Mark 
Rutte recently claimed that the solution to the problem of 
discrimination against ethnic minorities in the labour market 
lies	with	ethnic	minorities	themselves:	‘You	have	to	fight	your	
way	in.’	Another	example	is	the	often-heard	suggestion	that	
if men earn more than women for the same work, women 
should work on improving their salary negotiation skills. And 
for other disadvantaged groups as well, the following mot-
tos	 have	become	 all	 too	 familiar:	work	 harder,	 don’t	 com-
plain, and combat prejudice by proving your critics wrong. 
One popular way to combat inequality in the labour mar-











that there is a direct link between education and remuner-
ation:	we	believe	that	more	knowledge	will	get	you	a	better	
job	 (but	see	Box	2.1).	Education	 is	 thus	seen	as	 the	key	 to	
success. This idea stems from our belief in progress com-
bined with a strong faith in the knowledge-based economy, 
where knowledge workers are more valued and better paid 
than those in artisan trades or service occupations – even 
though one might question whether that is fair. 
Alongside this emphasis on the individual, an instrumental 
approach	is	often	used	to	try	to	reduce	inequality	in	educa-
tion and in the labour market. This approach stresses the 
importance of diversity and points out the gains that can be 
reaped by giving more women and minorities access to ed-
ucation and work. The famous ‘business case’ for diversity, 
for	example,	states	that	companies	are	financially	better	off	
with a diverse workforce, because diverse teams are more 
creative and more productive.
Unequal opportunities
The current debate thus focuses on individual and instru-
mental factors that explain intergroup inequality in edu-
cation and work, and these factors are used to come up 
with solutions. But if we take a closer look, we see that it is 
impossible to speak of genuinely equal opportunities. For 
example, someone from an ethnic minority background is 
more likely to be unemployed than a native Dutch person, 
Figure 3 
Relative likelihood of unemployment 
Graduates with a Western migrant vs. Dutch background












Source: ROA (2016), Schoolverlaters tussen Onderwijs en Arbeidsmarkt, 
ROA-R-2016/2
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even if they both received the same education (see Figure 
3).	One’s	ethnicity	and	social	background	partly	determines	
one’s success in education and work. Thus the image of a 
meritocracy in which everyone is able to fully realize his or 
her individual potential is incorrect. This calls for solutions 
that not only focus on individual choices and capabilities, 
but	 that	 also	 take	 into	 account	 the	 differences	 between	
these groups in society and the opportunities they receive.
The relationship between group membership and success 
in education and work
The idea that obtaining a good education leads to better 
outcomes is not entirely true. Some people become mil-
lionaires	without	having	followed	any	specific	training;	 for	
example, by taking over the family business or becoming 
pop stars or models. Others put an enormous amount of 
energy into their education and development, but are un-
able	to	find	a	good	job.	These	differences	cannot	be	sole-
ly ascribed to individual factors. The correlation between 
obtaining	higher	education	and	making	more	effort	on	the	
one hand and success in the labour market on the other is 
far from perfect. Moreover, this relationship is less strong 
for	certain	groups	than	it	 is	for	others.	Different	groups	in	
society	clearly	have	differing	opportunities	to	enter	higher	
education, to land a better-paid job, or to end up in a pres-
tigious	profession	(see	also	Box	2.2).
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Markets have an inherent tendency towards unequal 
outcomes, and not all such inequalities are unfair. 
For example, if two persons with the same educa-
tion earn different incomes because the one works 
long weeks whereas the other prefers more leisure 
time, the ensuing income difference is a consequence 
of their acting upon different goals in life. But there 
are other mechanisms at play as well that prevent 
equal opportunity from ensuring a minimum accept-
able level of equality of outcomes. There are various 
reasons for this. A first reason is luck: some people 
are lucky in terms of certain talents or physical re-
sources. Markets reward any source of resources, 
irrespective of whether these were obtained through 
luck or effort. Second, markets function on the basis 
of competition which is about winning. Competitive 
behaviour does not encourage cooperation with or 
help to disadvantaged groups. To the contrary, and 
this is the third reason why markets tend to increase 
inequality, strategic behaviour results in alliances by 
the most privileged individuals. They can lobby for 
regulations in their favour and in collusion between 
firms to win over other firms. Over time, even a ful-
ly free, competitive market, thus has a tendency to 
end up as an oligopoly including a few firms with the 
power to keep prices high and to put up barriers for 
potential new competitors. A fourth and final rea-
son why markets tend towards increased inequality 
is through the accumulation of advantage, which in 
turn allows for higher risk taking and more buffers 
against uncertainty. The flip side of this is the accu-
mulation of disadvantage by those with less talent, 
fewer resources, lower schooling, and worse health 
conditions. Since equal opportunity in a market set-
ting does not prevent increasing inequality in out-
comes, markets require continuous corrections in 
terms of redistribution, regulation, and public goods 
in order to prevent high levels of inequality.
Equal opportunities in markets are dynamic







Across the political spectrum, people agree that chil-
dren should have equal opportunities in life, equal 
chances to realise their capabilities. But to claim equal 
opportunity and social mobility as a guiding principle 
whilst ignoring income inequality is futile. Research 
consistently shows that children of poorer families 
have multiple disadvantages from birth onwards. 
They are more likely to have low birth weight or be 
born too soon, more likely to have ill health or de-
velopmental delays, less likely to be ready for school 
or to achieve well. If life is a race, some children are 
born with weights chained to their legs. In the UK 
Millennium Cohort Study, children who had been 
slow to develop their motor skills at nine months old 
were significantly more likely to have fallen behind 
in their cognitive development and were more like-
ly to be less well behaved at age five. Poor children 
were almost a year behind middle class children by 
the time they started school. This isn’t because poor 
parents don’t care about nurturing their children’s 
development –but inequality increases pressures 
on parents, increasing mental health problems, drug 
and alcohol use, long working hours, family tensions, 
and debt. Investment in early childhood programmes 
and support for new families can help to disrupt the 
intergenerational transmission of disadvantage, but 
much better would be to reduce the inequality that 
continuously creates such problems. International 
comparisons also clearly show that child wellbeing 
is significantly lower in more unequal countries, and 
among rich, developed countries where inequality 




types may even act as norms. Women who act in a 
dominant way or men who show emotions not only 
challenge our expectations, they go against what we 
deem appropriate. As a result, women and men who 
step out of their gender role are evaluated very nega-
tively (e.g. a woman leader is ‘bossy’). As such, gender 
stereotypes are a powerful force that motivate wom-
en and men to act in line with their social role (e.g. 
women reducing working hours after having a child).
Finally, through a process called ‘stereotype threat’ 
stereotypes can directly reduce the motivation and 
performance of people who are targets of stereo-
types. A large body of experimental research shows 
that reminding people about negative stereotypes – 
be it blatantly (making a joke about women’s lack of 
mathematical ability) or subtly (asking Black students 
to record their race on an intelligence test) – directly 
limits cognitive abilities because it triggers negative 
emotions that take up working memory resources. 
Moreover, over time the stress of stereotype threat 
erodes people’s motivation, leading them to disen-
gage from domains in which they are negatively ste-
reotyped and choose domains in which they do not 
face the burden of disproving a negative stereotype.
2.5
How group-based stereotypes restrict 
the opportunities of individuals
Belle Derks 
In public discourse the underrepresentation of cer-
tain groups in work and education (e.g. underrep-
resentation of women in leadership or STEM fields, 
ethnic minorities in higher education) is often at-
tributed to the different choices people make, or 
differences in interest or ability. However, psycho-
logical research has revealed the significant impact 
that group-based stereotypes have on the ability of 
people targeted by these stereotypes to reach their 
optimal potential and the choices they make. 
The stereotypes that exist in society concerning gen-
der (women are family-oriented; men are career-ori-
ented), race (e.g., racial differences in intelligence) 
or sexual orientation (e.g., gay men are effeminate) 
affect people belonging to these groups in several 
ways. 
Firstly, stereotypes shape people’s perception. Im-
portantly they do so without us being consciously 
aware. For example, because stereotypes imply that 
women have lower leadership qualities than men, a 
woman needs to show more evidence of high ability 
than a man to be deemed equally qualified for a lead-
ership position.
Secondly, in the case of gender specifically, stereo-
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According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and	Development	(OECD),	a	person’s	success	in	education	
and work is correlated with his or her parents’ socio-eco-
nomic background, including their income. Children from 
low-income	families	are	less	likely	to	be	able	to	afford	the	
costs of going to university, even if they are smart enough 
to get in. Parents with more money can help their children 
receive	a	good	education	even	if	they	are	not	so	proficient	
at learning, by paying for tutors or for exam training. Even in 
countries where everyone has free access to good educa-
tion, such as in the Netherlands, parental income level still 
has	an	influence	on	a	child’s	success.	
These	 differences	 between	 groups	 in	 society	 mean	 that	
some people must overcome all kinds of obstacles in their 
education and career, while others are more likely to get a 
helping hand along the way. Even if the individual advantag-
es	 and	disadvantages	 are	 not	 particularly	 significant,	 they	
accumulate over time. Those who receive more resourc-
es	and	support	can	afford	to	take	more	risks	or	build	up	a	
buffer	against	periods	of	uncertainty.	This	makes	 it	 easier	
for them to take advantage of new opportunities. But those 
who are just getting by – because they have less talent, 










Everyone tends to use generalized notions about a group 
in order to assess individuals from that group. Although 
this kind of stereotyping allows us to make a complex world 
more comprehensible, it also leads to prejudice that can 
sometimes be far removed from reality. Stereotypes colour 
our perceptions. The children of less educated parents, for 
example, are more likely to be referred to lower secondary 
school tracks, even if they do well in school. If Fatima makes 
a mistake, we tend to think that she is unable to do the task, 
but if Sophie makes a mistake, we assume that she was not 
concentrating. Even if someone does better than expected, 
stereotypes	can	work	against	them:	female	managers	who	
act like managers are considered bossy and are negatively 
evaluated, while the same behaviour in male managers is 
rated	positively.	And	finally,	the	realization	that	others	have	
negative expectations of a particular group can undermine 
the performance of individual members of that group. This 
is called stereotype threat	(see	Box	2.5).
Not only explicit, but also implicit preconceptions can haunt 
members of ethnic groups, women, or sexual minorities. 
This	 is	 often	more	 problematic	 because	 people	 are	 una-
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There is a lot of evidence that gender roles are to a 
large extent socially constructed. Ideas about what 
women and men are like, tend to vary a lot across 
space and time and thus cannot be defined without 
reference to the cultural and historical context. Also, 
women differ a lot from each other in what they want 
in life. Furthermore, many women have deviated 
from society’s expectations which should remind us 
that there is not one definition of what it is to be a 
woman. 
Gender differences result from nature and nurture. 
Striving for gender equality, however, does not mean 
that everyone has to be the same. Rather, it can mean 
that people are provided with the opportunity to de-
velop in a way that suits them, independently of their 
sex or gender. This means that we should resist gen-
dered expectations and make no assumptions about 
men’s and women’s career and family choices.
Women are still disadvantaged in the workplace 
compared to men: they earn less for the same job and 
are less likely to achieve higher positions. Besides 
the gender bias that they face, women also contrib-
ute to gender inequality by making different career 
and family choices than men. What are the causes of 
these differences? 
Difference feminism states that women are simply 
different from men and therefore want different 
things; these differences should be celebrated and 
re-valued. For example, caring for children and fam-
ily members should be valued as much as a career 
outside the home. Liberal feminists agree that this 
may indeed help us overcome certain forms of ine-
quality, but warn us that we should not too readily 
assume that women really want different things than 
men. Rather, our culture creates and perpetuates 
such strong expectations and role models, that our 
preferences, desires, and aspirations follow suit. 
2.6




ware	that	 it	 is	happening,	and	because	 it	can	 influence	the	
behaviour of people who are genuinely trying to treat every-
one	equally.	Implicit	biases	primarily	influence	assessments	
in ambiguous and complex situations in which people rely 
on their gut instinct as well as the general impression they 
have of the other person. 
This	has	been	identified	in	research	on	interviews	in	which	a	
White job interviewer assesses a Black candidate. An inter-
viewer who feels less at ease with a Black candidate tends un-
consciously to exhibit less encouraging non-verbal behaviour. 
For example, the interviewer may make less eye contact or 
give the candidate less time to answer questions. This leads to 
a so-called self-fulfilling prophecy in which the candidate feels 
less	at	ease,	affecting	his	or	her	self-presentation	and	thereby	
confirming	the	interviewer’s	negative	expectations.	Research	
has shown that these kinds of unconscious processes cause 
members of under-represented groups to under-perform in 
all sorts of school and work-related situations.
In the long term, exposure to stereotypical expectations and 
implicit prejudice can result in people becoming less motivat-
ed or adjusting their ambitions to the opportunities that they 
find	 (see	Box	2.6).	 If	 girls	hear	often	enough	 that	engineer-
ing is for men, they will be less inclined to choose a technical 
profession. These more or less invisible processes contribute 
to the perpetuation of inequality by members of privileged 
groups as well as members of disadvantaged groups.
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The paradox of equality
On the one hand, research clearly shows that equal abili-
ties,	efforts,	and	achievements	can	still	lead	to	different	out-
comes as a result of the accumulation of small advantages 
or disadvantages generated by stereotypical expectations. 
On the other hand, many of our attempts to treat people 
equally are based on the assumption that we are capable 
of assessing individual merits and opportunities in an ob-
jective manner. In some cases, the conviction that this is 
possible can even make the situation worse. If organiza-
tions, for example, emphasize individual achievements and 
declare themselves to be open to diversity, managers are 
more inclined to believe that they are objective in their as-
sessments. This, in turn, makes them less alert to the possi-
bility that stereotypical expectations may be colouring their 
judgement,	as	a	 result	of	which	employees	actually	suffer	
more from implicit biases. This is called the ‘paradox of 
equality’. 
All in all, there are enough indications that in order to elim-
inate inequality in the labour market, it is not enough sim-
ply to open up educational opportunities to disadvantaged 
groups. At every stage of a career, stereotypes and preju-
dice	continue	to	affect	the	opportunities	that	an	individual	
gets to demonstrate what they are capable of and the re-
muneration they receive for their achievements.
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The selection and valuing of professions
There	is	a	big	difference	in	the	value	and	remuneration	at-
tached	 to	 different	 professions,	 even	 for	 professions	 that	
require the same level of education. A job with government, 
for example, does not pay as much as a similar job in the cor-
porate world. Ethnic minorities and women are over-repre-
sented in the service sector and the public sector, and more 
men can be found in technical positions and in the corporate 
world.	This	partly	explains	the	difference	in	salaries	between	
men and women, but individuals have less freedom to select 
a	particular	profession	or	sector	than	may	at	first	seem	to	be	
the case. People select precisely those professions in which 




expected to take on the major responsibility for caring for 
the family. Jobs in which women are over-represented are 
systematically valued less and are less well paid than jobs 
that are dominated by men. This has little to do with the 
characteristics or the demands of the job. As the number of 
women entering a particular profession increases, there is 
a decline in the status and salary of that profession, a phe-
nomenon known as ‘Sullerot’s law’. This is certainly the case 
in the health care sector, or in the Dutch judiciary. 
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A moral perspective
Opportunities in education and in the labour market are 
thus not only determined by one’s own merits. Society re-
quires	the	same	achievements	from	people	facing	different	
circumstances, and the choices that people are given are 
limited by the fact that they belong to a certain group. This is 
partly the result of unconscious processes that are perpet-
uated by both privileged and disadvantaged groups. What 
are the implications of this if we want to reduce inequality?
It	is	not	enough	for	us	simply	to	realize	that	different	groups	
attain	differing	levels	of	success	in	education	and	work.	For	
one thing, people tend to rationalize inequality. We like to 
believe that the world around us is fair and we therefore 
close	our	eyes	 to	 injustice	 (see	also	Box	4.2).	 Second,	 the	
way	in	which	implicit	bias	works	is	often	unconscious	and	
unintentional.	 The	 effects	 of	 implicit	 prejudice	 therefore	
cannot be eradicated by simply deciding that everyone de-
serves to be treated equally. Third, it is particularly painful 
for us to face our own shortcomings when we fail to behave 
according to the moral values that we hold dear – such as 
fair	treatment	for	all	(see	also	Boxes	1.3	and	1.5).	It	is	easier	to	




Even when it is clear that something must be done, this 
does not indicate what should be done or who should do it. 
Should the government impose rules or should we leave it 
to employers? Should the solution be anonymous job appli-
cations or policies targeting certain groups?
In order to answer these questions, we need to make a 
distinction	between	equality	and	equity.	The	difference	be-
tween these two concepts lies in the focus on the starting 
position	 in	which	people	find	 themselves	 (see	Figure	4).	 If	
we treat everyone in the same manner, we ignore the un-
equal	starting	position	of	different	groups	and	the	unequal	
obstacles that stand in their way. This means that they do 





that target particular groups. To decide what is needed in 
order	to	be	able	to	offer	everyone	equal	opportunities,	we	
must	first	map	out	the	visible	and	less	visible	obstacles	that	






What can you do?
If certain conditions were met, equal opportunities in ed-
ucation and the labour market would be achievable. First, 
we must recognize that access to education is not sufficient 
to reduce inequality in the labour market. Second, we need 
to ask ourselves whether the ‘choices’ that people make 
reflect	 their	 own	wishes	 or	 are	 the	 result	 of	 stereotypical 
expectations. And third, we must focus on the causes of un-
equal opportunities instead of tackling their consequences. 
If people were given a more equal starting position at the 
beginning of their career, they would be better able to take 
advantage of the opportunities that arise. Then there would 
be less need for retrospective compensatory measures, 
which many people consider to be unfair. Investing in the 
development	of	children	in	their	early	years	offers	the	best	
prospect of preventing the cycle of deprivation from being 
passed	from	generation	to	generation	(see	also	Box	2.4).
If we were thereby able to increase the success of minor-
ity groups in the labour market, this would also eventual-
ly reduce the explicit and implicit prejudice against these 
groups. In the short term, this requires clear choices, a will-
ingness to invest in the future, and careful communication. 
Affirmative	action	policies	will	be	viewed	as	unfair	prefer-
ential treatment as long as it remains unclear what kinds 
of obstacles these target groups face. Citing instrumental 
arguments such as the ‘business case for diversity’ as the 
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most important motivation behind such policies is a risky 
approach. This suggests that there is a gain to be made in 
the short term. Increasing diversity is a question of patience 
and	perseverance,	however,	and	may	initially	involve	signifi-
cant costs. We may expect more support for a diversity pol-
icy	that	is	motivated	by	moral	arguments.	People	are	often	
willing to do what is right in a broader social, historical, and 
moral	context,	even	 if	 they	do	not	benefit	 from	 it	directly.	
Current debates about inequality in education and work 
tend to emphasize individual choices and responsibilities, 
even when group memberships limit their opportunities to 
be successful in their education or professional career. To 
create truly equal opportunities, it is important to take into 




The consequences of social inequality are manifold. In this 
chapter, we examine the consequences of inequality for 
mental and physical health. In countries with wide income 
disparities, residents are generally in poorer physical and 
mental health than their counterparts in more equal coun-
tries	(see	Figure	5).	And	within	such	countries,	it	is	primarily	
those with a lower level of education and lower incomes 
who have adverse health outcomes. On average, they lead 
more unhealthy lives than people with a higher level of edu-
cation and higher incomes. In addition, people with a lower 
social status are sick more frequently and have a lower life 
expectancy. People with low incomes and education are at 
a clear disadvantage when it comes to their health. But why 
is this the case?
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Figure 5.2
The prevalence of mental illness is 

































Source: Wilkinson & Pickett, The Spirit Level (2009)
person’s own responsibility. People are encouraged to eat 
less sugar and fat, to exercise more, to refrain from smoking, 
and	to	drink	less	alcohol.	Health	policies	are	often	focused	
on informing people about what constitutes a healthy or 
unhealthy lifestyle and convincing them to change their be-
haviour.	 Financial	 incentives	 are	 often	 used	 to	 encourage	
people to change their habits. For example, the government 
levies high taxes on alcohol and cigarettes, and medical care 
in many countries has a deductible. Sometimes health in-
surance premiums are even tailored to a person’s individual 
health behaviour. 
We	assume	 that	 financial	 incentives	 help	people	 to	make	
the	 right	 (healthy)	 choices,	 because	 they	 allow	 people	 to	
weigh	up	the	costs	and	benefits	of	their	unhealthy	behav-
iour. This approach is in line with the idea that everyone is 
essentially free and should be free to make their own choic-
es. Measures to ‘protect people from themselves’ are some-
times seen as unwarranted government interference. 
But	 the	financial	 incentives	 that	are	used	do	not	work	 for	
everyone in the same way. Making medical care more ex-
pensive	mainly	affects	people	with	little	disposable	income.	
Higher costs could cause people with lower incomes to 
avoid available health care or not buy prescribed medicines, 
which would in turn result in larger health problems. And 
paradoxically enough, the impact of raising the price of cig-
arettes to reduce smoking turns out to be smaller among 
Figure 5.3

































ing	 it	more	 difficult	 to	 stop	 smoking	 even	when	 smoking	
becomes more expensive. Thus we could ask ourselves 
whether healthy behaviour is a personal choice, or wheth-
er people on lower incomes simply lack freedom of choice 
(see	Box	3.2).




vent higher health care costs in the long term. But given the 
above,	it	 is	questionable	whether	this	is	the	most	effective	
approach. There are other arguments that can be used to 
justify	investment	in	health	care.	After	all,	how	fair	is	it	to	dis-
miss health disparities as a matter of personal responsibility?
One’s own fault?
If	 we	 consider	 all	 the	 behaviours	 that	 affect	 a	 person’s	
health, it is debatable how many of these behaviours are 
genuinely	free	choices.	After	all,	the	way	people	behave	also	





In the UK, commissions into health inequalities have 
made recommendations to improve public health by 
closing the health gap between rich and poor and by 
policies directed towards reducing health inequali-
ties. But these policies have failed: the gap is actually 
growing. Despite the research evidence that suggests 
we need to tackle the wider social determinants of 
health (e.g., income, unemployment, poverty, ine-
quality), policy emphasis on individual lifestyle dom-
inates. Lifestyle drift – the tendency to recognize the 
need for action on ‘upstream’ social determinants 
of health inequalities only to drift ‘downstream’ to 
focus largely on individual lifestyle factors (such as 
smoking, drinking, diet, exercise) – fits with politi-
cal narratives of individual choice and responsibility. 
Associated with this is a move away from action to 
address the social gradient towards activities target-
ed at the most disadvantaged groups. The result is a 
personalization of morbidity and narratives of blame: 
individual choices damage our health, while health 
inequalities and the social injustice and health effects 






Each of us has to contribute her fair share. People 
who do not do this are not entitled to benefits that 
the others have generated – at least not when they 
did not make an effort. Furthermore, people are 
not entitled to help or assistance when they fail to 
contribute themselves. It may well be that this con-
ception of fairness is as such impeccable. However, 
it is often applied in a way that has pernicious con-
sequences.
Suppose you are unemployed, obese, or otherwise 
disadvantaged. People may conclude from the fact 
that you are impaired in one of these ways that you 
did something wrong. They are encouraged to do so 
in contexts that put a lot of emphasis on individual 
responsibility. In such an environment, people easily 
blame others for whatever disadvantage they suffer 
from.
Applying the logic of responsibility just described 
is dangerous and can have paradoxical effects. Of-




their control. For instance, someone might be unem-
ployed because he is discriminated against, perhaps 
due to his ethnic background or sexual orientation. 
If too much emphasis is put on individual responsi-
bility, even such a person ends up being blamed for 
the position he is in. Or if not blamed, he might feel 
guilty for not measuring up to the standards set by 
society. After all, he does not contribute, so he must 
have done something wrong.
In order to avoid blaming people in insulting and de-
bilitating ways, it is vital to appreciate the importance 
of collective responsibility. The logic of individual re-
sponsibility works only when background conditions 
are fair – for instance, when people are not discrimi-
nated. Achieving this requires shared action, and, for 
instance, a willingness to mutually correct each oth-
er’s behaviour. The upshot is that the logic of individ-
ual responsibility can be applied properly only once 





ter education, a better career, and a higher income have the 
option of living more spaciously – on the outskirts of the 
city, for example – because they not only have enough mon-
ey	to	pay	for	a	larger	house,	but	they	can	also	afford	to	buy	
a car to drive to their work. Those who do not have enough 
money live in relatively cheap, densely-populated neigh-
bourhoods – in the centre of the city or even in ‘ghettos’ of 
flats	in	unattractive	suburbs.	
Living	 conditions	 that	 have	 a	 positive	 influence	on	health	
(clean air, sporting facilities, a selection of fresh and healthy 
food,	 leisure	activities)	are	 thus	more	easily	accessible	 for	
privileged groups than for groups at the bottom of the social 
pyramid	(see	also	Box	5.1).	In	other	words,	there	is	a	phys-
ical	separation	between	different	groups	of	people	due	to	
where they live and the facilities (including health care facil-
ities)	that	are	available	to	them.	This	serves	to	perpetuate	
the	differences	in	circumstances	and	lifestyle	that	are	crucial	
for health. Even in adjacent neighbourhoods within a city, 
this	leads	to	different	health	outcomes.
Decisions made by government institutions and companies 
also constrain the choices that people can make with regard 
to their health. To whom is housing in a particular neigh-
bourhood allocated and where can sporting facilities be 
found?	What	kind	of	working	conditions	do	we	find	accept-
able, and are the guidelines actually enforced? But it also 
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Research over many decades and in many different 
countries has shown that people with lower socioec-
onomic status suffer much more ill health and have 
shorter life expectancy. Even within developed coun-
tries, like the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, 
there is an 8-10 year difference in life expectancy 
between neighbourhoods within the same city. That 
is true whether status is measured by occupational 
class, education, income, by whether or not you own 
your house, or whether you live in a richer or poorer 
area. In rich developed countries the scale of health 
disadvantage associated with being low on the social 
ladder varies from 2-5 years shorter life expectancy 
than those further up the ladder, to as much as 10, 15 
or – at the extreme – as much as 20 year differences 
in life expectancy. Importantly, the effects are found 
in men and women at all ages, and for most of the 
main causes of death.
Typically these differences in health are not simply 
differences between the poor and the rest of socie-
ty. Instead there is a gradient in health. Health gets 
worse at every step down the social ladder: Even 
the well-educated and affluent have slightly worse 
health than the very best educated and richest. When 
we have been able to take away the problem of pov-
erty and poor health, we may thus still find that most 
of the pattern of health inequalities remains.  
The social gradient in health
Kate Pickett and Richard Wilkinson 
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involves decisions about what kinds of illnesses and health 
conditions should be researched, what types of medicine 
are made available or are reimbursed, what vaccination 
programmes	there	are,	and	who	qualifies	for	them.	
Also at the level of research on health and sickness, there 
are	 significant	 disparities	 in	 the	 scientific	 knowledge	 that	
exists on diseases and cures. Much more is known about 
certain target groups than about others. Research into 
symptoms	and	knowledge	about	effective	treatments	and	
medicines are primarily based on experience with certain 
research groups – especially white men in Western socie-
ties. Whether these insights also help in the diagnosis and 
treatment of other groups is unclear. We know that some 
ailments	(for	example,	lactose	intolerance)	are	more	preva-
lent in people of Asian descent, but is this also the case for 
other syndromes? We now also know that observations of 
male patients form the basis for many standard protocols 
for diagnosis and treatment, which is far from optimal for 
other patient groups. This is certainly the case with heart 
attack	symptoms,	which	are	very	different	for	women	than	
for	 men	 and	 are	 consequently	 often	 recognized	 too	 late	
(see	also:	https://www.goredforwomen.org/).
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Being a member of a stigmatized or low status group 
has been related to a wide range of negative health 
outcomes. Social psychological research has identi-
fied three pathways through which these negative 
health outcomes emerge. 
First, being the target of prejudice forms a major 
source of stress among people with low status. This 
stress has in turn been related to a range of negative 
health outcomes, ranging from hypertension and 
cardiovascular disease to type II diabetes, asthma, 
arthritis, osteoporosis, and Alzheimer’s disease. 
Second, the stress associated with low societal status 
also negatively affect health because of the subop-
timal health behaviours it triggers. Being devalued 
by others can lead people to escape or avoid stress 
through coping strategies that directly damage their 
health, such as smoking, overeating, using drugs and 
alcohol and behaving in a risky way. At the same time, 
in order to refrain from eating unhealthy foods and 
smoking, exercise on a regular basis and adhere to 
medical regimes, people need to effortfully inhibit 
From social stigma to health
Belle Derks and Daan Scheepers 
3.4
their immediate desire and replace it with behaviour 
that is in line with more abstract health promotion 
goals. Research shows that stress undermines such 
self-regulatory strengths thereby indirectly under-
mining health among the stigmatized.
A final pathway via which stigma and low societal 
status undermine health occurs via the subopti-
mal interactions between stigmatized patients and 
non-stigmatized healthcare providers. First, health-
care providers’ prejudice towards patients with stig-
ma can lead them to feel less empathy and provide 
lower quality healthcare. Moreover, interactions be-
tween the stigmatized and non-stigmatized are often 
awkward for both parties involved, for example due 
to feelings of anxiety and uncertainty. In healthcare 
settings, these strains can tax the executive resources 
of both the healthcare provider (possibly leading to 
suboptimal medical decisions) as well as those of the 
patient (reducing their ability to understand medical 
information).
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face	different	prospects	 regarding	 their	 health.	 These	dif-
ferences are accumulative and can have far-reaching conse-
quences	(see	Box	3.3).	
In order to understand or to change the health behaviour 
of	individuals,	it	is	not	sufficient	to	look	at	individual	choices	
with respect to health behaviour and lifestyle, for the life-
style choices people make and the options and constraints 
they face are also determined by factors on which they 
themselves	have	 little	 influence.	Moreover,	 certain	groups	
in	society	(e.g.,	ethnic	minorities)	are	also	approached	and	
treated	 differently	 due	 to	 prejudice	 and	 stigmatization	
–	which	 in	 turn	has	a	negative	effect	on	 their	mental	 and	
physical	well-being	(see	Box	3.4).	In	cases	where	this	leads	
to	different	health	outcomes,	this	cannot	be	considered	an	
individual choice of lifestyle. Some people in society are less 
likely to have a long and healthy life for the simple reason 
that they belong to a particular group. Financial incentives 
are	of	no	use	here;	they	would	only	constitute	punishment	
for circumstances that people are unable to control.
Experts	 agree	 that	 health	 differences	 between	 different	
groups in society arise from a chain of causes. There is am-




regardless of the personal choices we make or the lifestyles 
we maintain. And yet far too little is done with these so-
called ‘social determinants’ of health in shaping government 
measures to rectify the situation, because the responsibility 
for a healthy lifestyle is for the most part attributed to the 




Different	 groups	 of	 people	 often	 live	 in	 separate	worlds.	
And	 within	 these	 groups,	 people	 influence	 each	 other	 in	
terms of how much they smoke or drink, when to go out 
together, whether or not to exercise together, and whether 
to eat traditional meals that are high in fat and low in vita-
mins.	The	fact	that	different	groups	live	in	separate	worlds	
makes	it	more	difficult	to	eliminate	health	differences.	If	you	
only have contact with people like you, you are unlikely to 
receive new information from them about healthy or un-
healthy lifestyle habits. The most obvious solution would 
then seem to be to detach people as much as possible from 
their	groups	and	from	the	environment	that	makes	it	diffi-
cult for them to act on health recommendations. But is this 
really the best solution?
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The link between social support and health
Research	shows	that	groups	can	also	have	positive	effects	
on the health of people who belong to them. This is some-
thing	that	is	often	overlooked.	The	positive	effects	are	not	
restricted	 to	 those	groups	 that	 are	 relatively	well	off;	dis-
advantaged	groups	in	society	can	also	offer	their	members	
support and thereby contribute to their well-being and 
health. 
People prefer to have contact with people who are similar 
to them and who have a better understanding of what they 
are going through and their problems, and who give them a 
sense	of	belonging.	Generally,	this	kind	of	contact	with	like-
minded	people	has	a	positive	effect	on	well-being.	It	does	
not matter whether the similarity involves one’s position in 
society, one’s knowledge or experience, or one’s preference 
for certain lifestyle habits. 
When people feel that they belong to a group and are ap-
preciated by others in that group, this gives them a certain 
degree of psychological resilience. As a result, they experi-
ence less stress, because they know they can rely on each 
other	for	support.	It	gives	them	the	confidence	that	they	will	
be	able	to	deal	effectively	with	any	problems	they	might	run	
into, and it gives them the faith that others will be there to 
help them, which in turn ensures that they are less troubled 
by	the	difficulties	they	encounter	(see	Box	3.5).
Over the years, various studies conducted among diverse 
Different experiments show that material support, 
displays of solidarity, and mutual helping are more 
likely to occur among those who resemble each oth-
er and encounter similar life difficulties (‘ingroup 
members’), than among those who have different 
life histories and backgrounds (‘outgroup members’). 
Paradoxically, the joint experience of suffering so-
cial disadvantage, for instance due to group-based 
discrimination, can only intensify the realization of 
sharing similar fates and further cement this bond. 
This happens also among people who do not par-
ticularly like each other and even when they do not 
know each other personally. This is one explanation 
why people enjoy more health benefits when they 
live and work among those who are similar to them, 
even if these are materially less well off. 
Further, being respected, included, and valued by 
others who have similar life histories and concerns is 
an important source of psychological resilience, that 
buffers people against the negative effects of stress 
and hardship. This is the case, even if the objective 
challenges they face remain the same. The awareness 
of being socially included and the subjective sense of 
group belonging enhance people’s feelings of esteem 
and well-being. This in turn provides them with more 
confidence that they can effectively cope with the 
hardship they face. Studies systematically compar-
ing people who feel excluded from social groups vs. 
socially included have demonstrated this to relate to 
better health outcomes over time. 




groups	 of	 people	 in	 different	 countries	 have	 shown	 that	
this kind of contact is not only gratifying, but also has very 
positive	effects	on	health	and	well-being.	This	‘group	den-
sity	effect’	(see	Box	3.6)	applies,	for	instance,	to	elderly	peo-
ple who have a better social network. Other examples can 
be found among immigrants in the US or Europe. Living 
in a group with likeminded people and the social support 
that this provides can protect people against the negative 
effects	of	 their	group’s	adverse	 lifestyle	or	social	environ-
ment.	These	health	benefits	are	even	visible	among	groups	
in which actual health conditions are less favourable. 
The best way to reduce health disparities may therefore not 
be to have people detach themselves from their group to 
live in another environment or to change their lifestyle. If 
this results in them losing their social network, this may ac-
tually have negative consequences for their health. People 
who have more contact with other likeminded people and 
who are more embedded in social groups and networks 
also enjoy better mental and physical health. It therefore 
makes more sense to look at whether and how it would be 
possible to improve the living conditions of disadvantaged 
groups more generally, so that these people can support 
each other in developing a healthier lifestyle. 
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to a low status minority group, and experience more 
prejudice and discrimination. It may be that the ef-
fects of stigma offset any advantage of improved 
individual or neighbourhood social status, and that 
social support and solidarity are lost. The importance 
of such social factors is illustrated by the ‘ethnic den-
sity’ effect. 
An example of this effect is shown in a study con-
ducted in the Netherlands. Researchers found that 
immigrants who live in neighbourhoods where their 
own ethnic group was only a small proportion of the 
population were at increased risk for certain psy-
chotic disorders. The risk of psychotic disorders for 
first and second generation immigrants from Moroc-
co, Surinam, and Turkey was twice as high in low eth-
nic density neighbourhoods as in high ethnic density 
neighbourhoods, in which at least 65 percent of the 
population was immigrant. 
Members of low status minority communities living 
in an area with a higher proportion of their own racial 
or ethnic group sometimes have better health than 
those who live in areas with fewer people like them-
selves. This is known as the ‘group density’ effect of 
neighbourhood characteristics on health.
‘Group density’ effects, seen in studies of mental 
illness and physical health, can seem counterintui-
tive. Usually, taking into account people’s income, 
education and social class, living in a poorer area is 
associated with worse health. Members of ethnic 
minorities who live in areas where there are few 
like themselves tend to be better educated and have 
higher incomes than those who live in areas with a 
higher concentration of people of a similar ethnicity, 
so we would expect their health to be better. Howev-
er, through the eyes of the majority community, eth-
nic minorities may be made more aware of belonging 
3.6
Group-density effect
Kate Pickett and Madeleine Power 
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What is fair?
The main conclusion of the research discussed in this chap-
ter is that the causes of health disparities are not only to be 
found in the individual choices that people make, but that 
their	 lifestyles	 and	 health	 behaviours	 are	 also	 influenced	
by the groups in which they live, as well as various politi-
cal choices and commercial decisions that lie beyond their 
control.	This	is	because	different	groups of people face un-
equal	health	outcomes	that	stem	from	the	differences	in	the	










yses at the societal level, such incentives do not take into 
account the unequal treatment of certain groups in society. 
A	more	effective	way	to	eradicate	differences	in	health	out-
comes would be to strive for the more equitable treatment 
of	 various	 groups	 of	 people.	 This	 is	 because,	more	 often	






have moved to areas where life is better, or at least appears 
to be better. Social inequality is closely linked to migration 
and the challenges that migration brings. The great disparity 
between	different	parts	of	 the	world	 is	a	 reason	 for	peo-
ple	to	migrate:	people	will	travel	from	areas	where	famine	
prevails to countries blessed with apparent abundance (see 
Figure	6).
The situation at the global level also has consequences for 
the societies to which migrants emigrate. Although migra-
tion can reduce inequality at a global level, it can reinforce 
inequality	 at	 the	 local	 level	 (see	 Box	 4.1).	 The	 increase	 in	
–	often	cheap	–	labour	due	to	the	arrival	of	migrants	affects	
the development of wages and the supply of jobs. Migrants 
need to be housed, but this means that there are fewer in-
expensive housing options for others. This puts a strain on 
people’s sense of security, in particular among those in the 






tainty are felt primarily by the lower socio-economic class-
es,	while	the	benefits	of	globalization	and	multiculturalism	
are enjoyed primarily by the higher socio-economic classes.
This	 chapter	 considers	 how	 social	 inequality	 influences	 a	
host	society’s	attitude	towards	immigrants.	We	first	look	at	
the arguments currently dominating the debate on migra-
tion, before examining the added value of a moral perspec-




Every day, across the planet, more than 350,000 
children are born. One of the factors that has the 
most significant impact on their expected quality of 
life –their standard of living, their health, their life 
expectancy– is also one of the most arbitrary. It is 
their country of birth, and the citizenship that they 
will acquire. Many have referred to this as ‘the birth 
right lottery’. Some children win, by being born into 
affluent societies, while others are born into pover-
ty. This is widely regarded as unjust. As the ‘lottery’ 
metaphor suggests, those who wind up affluent did 
nothing to earn that privilege, they merely got lucky. 
There is an important feature of the world system 
that significantly reinforces the effects of this lottery: 
The global state system permits very little migration. 
There is an obvious egalitarian objection to this prac-
tice. Many of the more severe inequalities between 
nations could be dramatically reduced if states would 
just open up their borders to increased migration. 
Within liberal states, freedom of movement is con-
sidered an important individual right. It is unclear 
why this right should not create a strong presump-
tion against the forms of border control that are 
currently exercised internationally by states. At the 
same time, large-scale migration is associated with 
significant strains. Not least is the fact that while mi-
gration of low-skilled labour from poor countries to 
rich countries can reduce global inequality, it will also 
tend to increase domestic inequality within wealthi-
er nations by putting downward pressure on wages. 
This poses a dilemma for those who are concerned 
about inequality. There is an impartial demand to re-
duce global inequality. But there is also a form of par-
tiality involved in concern for one’s co-citizens, and 
of the quality of civic life in one’s own society. This 
Rank Territory Value
11 Brunei Darussalam 19
12 Saudi Arabia 17
13 Canada 16
14 Côte d'Ivoire 13
15 Switzerland 13
16 United States 11
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“And none will doubt but that our emigration … has proved most useful to the British nation.”
Richer territories tend to experience
net immigration (greater immigration
than emigration). Just under half of
the 200 territories mapped currently
experience net immigration. Those
territories with net emigration
(greater emigration than immigration)
have size zero on this map.
Regions experiencing the highest net
immigration are North America,
Western Europe and the Middle East.
Together these three regions account
for 79.5% of world net immigration.
The United States alone receives
37.1% of the world net total.
• Data source: World Bank, World Development Index, 2005
I• International emigrants are people living outside the territory
in which they were born, including refugees.
• This map shows territories with an overall gain of people
due to migration. Negative values (net emigration) are not
shown.
• The graph shows the total of territories’ net
immigration (when positive) in each region.
• See website for further information.
Territory size shows the relative levels of net immigration





















The debate on migration is strongly characterized by 
thinking in terms of ‘us and them’. Migrants are frequently 
referred to as ‘the migrants’ or ‘the refugees’ in both argu-
ments for and against their admittance. Although a distinc-
tion	 is	 often	made	between	different	 groups	of	migrants,	
such as refugees as opposed to so-called ‘fortune-seekers’, 
people seldom refer to migrants as unique individuals. The 
tendency to see migrants as a separate group makes it eas-
ier to believe that when they encounter problems, it is their 
own	fault	(see	Box	4.2).
If we look at the reasoning used in the debate, economic ar-
guments	immediately	stand	out.	An	often-heard	anti-immi-




pared to take jobs in the cleaning or crop picking sectors, 
which, so the argument goes, ‘our own people are unwilling 
to do’. It is also pointed out that migrants have made the 
nation great over the centuries (in the case of the Nether-
lands, the Portuguese Jews, the Huguenots and, more re-
cently,	 Surinamese	 footballers)	 and	 that	 taking	 a	 tolerant,	
open-minded	approach	has	brought	the	nation	a	significant	
amount of economic prosperity. 
partiality often takes extreme and illegitimate forms. 
This does nothing, however, to defeat the basic chal-
lenge, which involves articulating some form of rea-
sonable partiality, which can be balanced against the 
demand to remedy the more general wrong that is 
the effect of the birth right lottery.
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Economic reasoning does not lead to consensus
But	what	exactly	is	the	scientific	evidence	for	these	instru-
mental	arguments?	Do	migrants	benefit	the	economy	or	do	
they simply cost money? A closer examination shows that 
the	situation	 is	more	complicated	than	 it	 is	often	believed	
to	be.	More	importantly,	an	economic	cost-benefit	analysis	
will ultimately fail to bring consensus in the debate on im-
migration. 
Research has shown that a rise in immigration has a slightly 
positive	effect	on	economic	growth.	In	addition,	a	number	
of myths about the economic costs of immigrants can be 
debunked. In general, migrants do not rely unduly on so-
cial	insurance;	they	are	primarily	motivated	to	work.	Indeed,	
migrants generally contribute more to social insurance than 
they themselves get out of it. Ironically, this is particularly 
the	case	for	illegal	immigrants	whose	employers	often	with-
hold social insurance contributions from their wages, while 
the illegal immigrants are themselves unable (or do not 
dare)	to	benefit	from	social	security	schemes,	due	to	their	
unofficial	status.	
Why is the idea that immigrants are a burden on the econ-
omy so persistent, even though it is at least partly a myth? 
One answer lies in the belief that the economy is a zero-sum 
game:	 if	one	group	gains,	 this	means	that	the	other	group	
loses – and with more competitors, there is less for every-
one. But a modern economy does not work in this way. 
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Members	 of	 the	 host	 society	 actually	 benefit	 from	 immi-
gration – for example, because they can get ahead in their 
company more easily than an immigrant who doesn’t speak 
the language very well or doesn’t know the system. And the 
economic growth that migration generates can also have 
positive	effects	 for	non-immigrants.	 In	 fact,	previous	gen-
erations	of	migrants	are	often	most	at	risk	of	being	forced	
out of the labour market. And real problem-groups in the 
labour	market	will	 in	any	case	have	difficulty	finding	a	job,	
even without the presence of migrants.
Although	 preconceptions	 about	 the	 economic	 effects	 of	
migration	are	often	unfounded,	it	would	be	incorrect	to	say	
that immigration is automatically a driver of economic suc-
cess. There are simply too many factors at play. It makes a 
big	difference	whether	one	looks	at	the	short	term	or	the	
long	term.	In	the	1960s,	migrant	labourers	were	brought	to	
the	Netherlands	as	cheap	 labour.	 In	 the	1980s,	however,	a	
significant	number	of	them	became	unemployed	when	the	
industries	 in	 which	 they	 worked	 (textiles,	 mining)	 disap-
peared.	Another	example	is	the	current	influx	of	refugees.	In	
the short term, this will mostly cost money. But in the long 
term, refugees may bring money into the society, especially 
if	they	are	highly	educated	(for	example,	in	IT),	quickly	learn	
to speak the language, and integrate well into the host soci-
ety	in	other	ways.	The	final	economic	costs	and	benefits	of	
migration thus depend on a number of factors.
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4.2
Motivations to justify inequality 
Jojanneke Van der Toorn
Although inequality, exploitation, and injustice are 
the order of the day, people are less likely to rebel 
against this than you would expect. One reason for 
this is that people tend to rationalize the status quo, 
even when the status quo puts them at a disadvan-
tage. We simply prefer to believe that the world 
around us is just and that people get what they de-
serve because this contributes to our sense of secu-
rity and control. The notion that misfortune is arbi-
trary is, after all, a distressing thought.
One way in which people justify the system is by us-
ing meritocratic explanations for social and economic 
inequality. According to this type of ideology (such as 
‘the American Dream’), people owe their position in 
society to their own efforts. This has consequences 
for how members of disadvantaged groups and priv-
ileged groups see themselves and others. Those who 
have not gotten far in life receive the blame for their 
own misfortunes, but we look up to those who have 
succeeded in life. It is for this reason that victims are 
often held responsible for their own adversity and 
success is lauded.
The tendency to believe in a just world is so strong 
that people sometimes accept the social order even 
when it works to the detriment of themselves or 
their group. This may seem irrational but can be ex-
plained by the fact that rationalization reduces the 
anxiety and insecurity that is caused by an unequal 
and possibly unjust world. Because of these psycho-
logical benefits, both privileged and disadvantaged 
groups go along with this way of thinking. For priv-
ileged groups, moreover, rationalization means that 




Framing the immigration debate purely in terms of econom-
ics gives rise to another problem. Research into migration 
trends and economic growth is mostly based on macroe-
conomic considerations, such as the relationship between 
the percentage of immigrants in a country and economic 
growth. However, this can lead people to forget that there 
are local costs associated with immigration, certainly in the 
short-term, such as costs related to housing, education, 
care, and other services. These are precisely the kinds of 
things that people worry about. It is primarily within the lo-
cal community that people are confronted with immigrants, 
and	 for	 these	people,	 the	 long-term	benefits	of	accepting	
migrants into a country are less visible. A tension can there-
fore	develop	between	macroeconomic	benefits	in	the	long	
term and local costs in the short term. This is something that 
is	not	sufficiently	taken	into	account	if	one	looks	at	the	mi-
gration debate solely from an economic perspective. 
The complexity of economic factors makes it unlikely that 
supporters and opponents of immigration will ever agree 
with each other on purely economic grounds. But there 
is a more fundamental reason why limiting the debate to 
economic	 issues	 is	of	 little	help:	 in	 forming	an	opinion	on	
immigration, there are many other factors – such as identity, 





The importance of identity, morality, and emotion
Immigrant groups and the religious and cultural ideas that 
they bring with them can give members of the host society 
the feeling that their culture and identity are being eradicat-
ed. In other words, the presence of ‘the other’ can infringe 
upon their image of what makes their society distinctive. 
This is particularly threatening in the context of a number of 
other developments that put pressure on a sense of nation-
al identity. One such development is the growing individu-
alization in society, which is already eroding the degree of 
cohesiveness among citizens. Another development is the 
increasingly abstract identities that people feel are being 
imposed	on	 them	 (the	 ‘European	 ideal’),	 for	example	as	a	
result of globalization and the ongoing process of European 
integration. This combination of factors is putting pressure 
on people’s sense of national identity. In various countries, 
the desire to limit immigration is motivated not solely by 
economic considerations, but primarily by concerns about 
a	country’s	own	identity	(see	Figure	7).
Even people who have a more positive attitude towards 
migrants	often	base	their	arguments	on	 identity,	however,	
pointing out how immigrants can enrich the sense of na-
tional	 identity	 (see	Box	4.4).	Part	of	 the	Canadian	national	
identity is explicitly based on the notion that Canada is a na-
tion	of	immigrants.	In	a	similar	way,	the	Netherlands	is	often	

























































Explaining attitudes towards different 
groups of migrants
Source: Card, D., Dustmann, C. & Preston, I. (2012). ‘Immigration, Wages, 
And Compositional Amenities’. Journal of the European Economic Associ-
ation 10, 78-119 (table  5)
Type of migrant
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an open-minded culture and attitude to the outside world.
Besides instrumental and identity-based arguments, much 
of the reasoning in the migration debate is moral in nature. 
One of the main arguments for a lenient migration policy, 
particularly with regard to refugees, is the moral obligation 
to help others in need, given that we ourselves would want 
to	be	helped	under	 such	 circumstances	 (see	Box	4.3).	But	
the	desire	 to	 limit	migration	 is	 also	often	based	on	moral	
arguments, such as those based on a country’s sovereignty 
and the right to defend one’s own interests and to decide 
who	may	or	may	not	enter	the	country	(see	Box	4.1).	
Thus far we have talked mainly about the economic, iden-
tity-related, and moral reasoning that people use in the de-
bate	on	migration.	However,	such	arguments	often	 ignore	
the fact that attitudes towards migrants are also determined 
by emotions. Many economic and identity-based arguments 
are eventually based on fear. Such feelings do not arise out 
of people contemplating the economy and national identity, 
but tend to be much more fundamental and nestled in the 
gut. People experience a feeling of menace without being 
able to identify what exactly they are afraid of.
‘Integrated threat theory’ is a socio-psychological perspec-
tive	that	describes	three	different	ways	in	which	members	
of	other	groups	 (such	as	 immigrants)	can	be	perceived	as	





that emerge during actual contact with members of other 
groups. This fear can be traced back to a fear of everything 
that	 is	 different	 –	 an	 emotion	 that	 is	 partly	 evolutionarily	
determined. This fear is particularly strong when one’s own 
security	(in	particular,	one’s	physical	security)	is	at	risk.	The	
association of migrants with criminality and violence deter-
mines in a negative way both the quantity and the quality of 
contact between natives and members of migrant groups. 
One illustration of this is the collective fear of asylum seek-
ers in Western European societies following the mass sexu-
al	assaults	during	the	2015/2016	New	Year’s	Eve	celebrations	
in Cologne. Fear in today’s society is further reinforced by 
the reduced social cohesion within communities and the 
experience by people in multi-ethnic neighbourhoods of 
living alongside each other, but in separate worlds.
Social inequality colours the debate on migration
Both supporters and opponents of migration thus make use 
of economic, identity-based, and moral arguments. Within the 
host society, these arguments tend to be aligned with social 
class.	Pro-migration	positions	are	more	often	taken	by	those	
from higher social classes, whereas anti-migration views are 
more likely to be held by people from lower social classes.
People	who	are	less	well-off	have	more	reason	to	feel	threat-
ened economically, in the sense of being afraid to lose the little 
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they have. Also the more general uncertainty felt by those at 
the bottom of society makes them yearn for more stability in 
terms of their identity and culture. The way in which migrants 
threaten	that	culture	and	identity	will	be	felt	first	by	that	part	
of society experiencing the highest degree of uncertainty. 
Members of the lower social classes come into contact more 
often	with	migrants,	which	is	why	they	tend	to	overestimate	
their	numbers	and	their	 influence	on	Dutch	society.	By	con-
trast, members of the higher social classes come into contact 
mostly with the idea of migration, and not so much its direct 
practical consequences. And if they do come into contact 
with these consequences, they are more likely to be positive 
consequences in their case. Migrants can be cheap workers, 
or they might open new and interesting restaurants. Migra-
tion has positive outcomes for these people, because it con-
firms	the	identity	of	the	Netherlands	as	an	exemplary,	toler-
ant country and their own personal identity as enlightened, 
open-minded individuals.
Local versus global identification




versus a broader, more global	identification.	The	argument	
that we are morally obliged to help someone in need, re-
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gardless of his or her origin, is based on a global, universal 
identification	with	 ‘mankind’.	 The	 equally	moral	 argument	
that it is someone’s right to defend the interests of his or 
her village or country is, on the other hand, based on a more 
local	 identification	with	one’s	own	 community.	 In	our	dis-
cussion of the economic factors, we already touched upon 
the fact that pro-migration arguments are usually based 
on macroeconomic theories that have been developed by 
policymakers,	while	anti-immigration	arguments	often	stem	
from threats to jobs and security at the local level. The an-




cation can be found in various theories and observations. 
The sociologist Abram de Swaan, for example, has shown 
how	 ‘expanding	 circles	 of	 identification’	 have	 emerged	 in	
the	course	of	evolution.	While	identification	with	one’s	own	
family is as old as mankind, it was not until the hunter-gath-
erer	 period	 that	 identification	 with	 a	 wider	 community	
(tribe,	 village,	 region)	 emerged.	More	 recently,	 a	new	kind	
of	identification	has	emerged	–	identification	with	more	ab-
stract categories based on ethnicity, the nation-state, and 
even mankind in general. 
As	indicated	above,	socio-cultural	factors	and	different	in-
terests allow higher social classes to identify more easily 
4.3
Inequality, migration and moral duties
Pauline Kleingeld
The severe global inequality in standards of living 
gives people living in poverty reason to migrate to 
provide for their families or improve their own lives. 
States that are better off, in the sense that they are 
relatively affluent, have a duty, defined by interna-
tional law, to admit refugees. But they do not have a 
similar duty to admit people who are fleeing pover-
ty. Do citizens of affluent states have a moral duty to 
support opening the borders to immigrants? 
This question is often answered negatively, on the 
grounds that states and their populations have a le-
gitimate interest in preserving their culture, institu-
tions, standard of living, and other achievements that 
might be threatened by mass immigration. However, 
even in cases in which these threats are real and re-
strictions on immigration legitimate, such states still 
have a moral duty to alleviate unjust inequalities.
First, insofar as the poverty of others elsewhere is 
the result of an unjust global economic system that 
benefits the affluent, the affluent have a duty to pro-
mote a more just system, rather than continuing to 
profit from injustice. They could do so, for example, 
through political activity or their consumer behav-
iour. Second, it is widely acknowledged that the af-
fluent have a general moral duty to assist others in 
need, meaning that they have a duty to assist people 
suffering from poverty elsewhere in the world. Such 
assistance may range from influencing political insti-
tutions to promoting the improvement of education 
systems; obviously, what constitutes the best way 
depends on the specific causes of poverty and the 




more important for the lower social classes. But there are 
also more fundamental psychological reasons for this dif-
ference	in	identification.	People	who	have	more	status	and	
power are more inclined to perceive the world at a more 
global	 and	 abstract	 level	 (‘the	 big	 picture’),	 while	 people	
and groups with less status and power are more inclined to 
view	the	world	at	a	more	concrete	level	(‘the	details’).	If	you	
are able to operate relatively independently of others, you 
can	afford	to	pay	attention	to	the	big	picture	and	to	iden-
tify the opportunities. But if you are heavily dependent on 
others for even your most basic needs, you become more 
focused on your surroundings and the constraints that you 
face. Research has shown, for example, that experiencing 
a lack of control over one’s situation invokes feelings of 
threat and focuses one’s attention on the details of the lo-
cal situation, while those who have more opportunities to 
turn a situation to their own advantage tend to see things 
as positive challenges, are more focused on the big picture, 
and	can	perceive	broader	horizons.	The	German	Chancel-
lor	Angela	Merkel	used	the	motto	 ‘Wir	schaffen	das!’	 (‘we	
will	do	 it!’)	 to	present	 the	 immigration	problem	as	a	pos-
itive challenge. But given the fundamental psychological 
processes described above, it was to be expected that her 
appeal would fall on deaf ears among members of the low-
er social classes.
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A step forward in the debate on immigration
Does it help to take account of the fact that the arguments 
in	the	debate	on	immigration	are	partly	rooted	in	different	
levels	 of	 identification	 that	 have	 come	 about	 as	 a	 result	
of social inequality? In any case, acknowledging this does 
make	clear	that	we	need	to	find	a	balance	between	the	in-
terests of one’s own group on the one hand, and on the 
other hand, universal and thus transnational human rights 
(see	Box	4.3).	 In	philosophy,	 such	a	balance	 is	 called	 ‘rea-
sonable	partiality’	(see	Box	4.1).	One	of	the	ways	this	could	
take	shape	is	by	deploying	a	dual	identification	that	allows	
people to identify simultaneously with both the local and 
the global communities.
Within	philosophy,	 the	 idea	of	 simultaneous	 identification	
with	a	local	group	(community,	village)	and	the	global	group	
(‘mankind’)	goes	back	to	the	Stoics	and	their	cosmopolitan	
ideal. When Diogenes was asked where he came from, he 
answered:	‘I	am	a	citizen	of	the	World’.	In	the	Stoic	view	of	
morality,	world	citizenship	was	the	way	to	fulfil	one’s	moral	
duty to treat everyone as equals. Later Stoic views on cos-
mopolitanism nuanced this radical view somewhat in the 
sense	that	everyone	belongs	to	two	communities:	the	local	
community in which one is born and the world community. 
According to this more moderate view of cosmopolitanism, 
these	two	loyalties	are	not	 in	conflict	with	each	other,	be-
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cause world citizenship is compatible with local forms of 
political organization.
How does one embody this ideal in practice? In psychology, 
the idea of a dual identity has mainly been applied to opti-
mize relationships in a multicultural society. For example, it 
turns out that one can feel both ‘Moroccan’ and ‘Dutch’ at 
the	same	 time.	The	simultaneous	 identification	with	one’s	
own sub-group and with an overarching category is an ef-
fective way of bringing groups together. This was made ev-
ident in research on successful and less successful mergers 
of companies. A dual identity is useful because it allows the 
higher-level category to bind together the members of the 
different	groups,	while	at	the	same	time	retaining	each	per-
son’s bond with their own sub-group and that sub-group’s 
own	character:	in	other	words,	unity	in	diversity.
Shifting identities
Repeating anti- and pro-immigration standpoints will not 
bring us any further in the public debate on migration. 
For a genuine dialogue that leads to practicable solutions, 
these	 two	 camps	must	 first	 be	 brought	 closer	 together.	
To achieve this, those who are opposed to immigration 
should be reminded of the moral arguments that would 
help them to identify with a more global level. Those who 
are in favour of migration could take greater account of 
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the instrumental considerations that play a role if they are 
to identify with the local level as well. This would deepen 
the pro-immigration camp’s understanding of the prob-
lems that arise from inequality at the local level, while the 
anti-immigration camp would gain more insight into the 
problems arising from global inequality and the oppor-
tunities	that	migration	can	offer.	The	foundation	for	such	
shifts	in	identification	is	certainly	there	(see	Box	4.4).
Concerns about immigration are not only based on cold 
economic calculations, but precisely on empathy with ‘our 
own people’ within the local community, in particular the 
more vulnerable among them, such as the elderly and those 
living on or under the minimum wage. People who get to 
know immigrants, their families, and the problems they en-
counter will be quicker to see them as vulnerable members 
of the local community, instead of as intruders. Many of the 
initiatives currently being taken for the reception of asylum 
seekers are local in nature. In addition, there are plenty of 
examples of entire village communities coming to the de-
fence	of	asylum	seekers	(and	their	children)	who	have	ex-
hausted all legal processes and are facing deportation. This 
is precisely what philosopher Martha Nussbaum means 
when	she	refers	to	‘pulling	the	outer	circles	inside’:	abstract	
ideas about a world community and universal equality be-
come concrete when people can relate them to what they 





about racial problems in his country. He delved into the 
anger felt by many black citizens about the social inequal-
ity that had formed over the centuries. But he also spoke 
about the roots of racism among white citizens from the 
lower	 socio-economic	 classes	 and	 the	 (legitimate)	 anger	
they felt about their position and their opportunities. Ac-
cording to Obama, these people had just as little reason 
to feel privileged by their ethnicity. Without legitimizing 
racism	as	the	outcome,	he	shifted	his	analysis	from	an	ab-
stract, moral level to the grassroots level in which racism is 
rooted. He did not refer to abstract, moral principles (‘thou 
shalt	not	discriminate!’),	but	instead	showed	sensitivity	to	
the legitimate, everyday concerns of regular citizens from 
the lower socio-economic classes. Some analysts believe 
that it was this speech that brought him victory in the elec-
tions later that year.
4.4
Humans are social beings. In addition to the unique 
characteristics that define their personal identities, 
people can think of themselves and others as mem-
bers of social groups. The groups that we belong to 
– and the features that characterize these groups 
– provide us with a sense of who we are, where we 
belong, and how we are similar to some individuals 
and distinct from others. Such social identities can 
be defined very concretely (I am a Londoner) or at a 
higher level of abstraction (I am a human being). Be-
ing included, respected and valued by others who ac-
knowledge who we are and what we stand for is very 
important. This group-based sense of self – which 
is referred to as our ‘social identity’ – also functions 
as an important guideline for individual behavioural 
choices. Norms and practices that characterize the 
groups we belong to (‘ingroup’ norms) have a great-
er impact on our behaviour than those that stem 
from groups we see as less relevant to the self (‘out-
groups’), even if the behaviours they prescribe and 
the individual gains that can be achieved by behaving 






When we think of the issues surrounding climate change, 
its association with social inequality is not immediately 
clear. Climate change is a worldwide problem – the world 
is warming up, the world’s glaciers are melting – and this 
is something we need to solve in a practical way. But what 
does this have to do with social inequality? In this chapter, 
we will show that social inequality is closely intertwined 
with	climate	change.	We	live	 in	a	world	full	of	differences,	
including	when	it	comes	to	climate	change:	there	is	disparity	
in who will experience the most negative consequences of 
climate	change	(the	poor	countries	and	future	generations),	
but also in who emits the most CO2	(see	Figure	8),	who	has	
the most options when it comes to doing something about 
climate change, and who can most easily dodge their re-
sponsibilities	(the	richer	countries;	see	Box	5.1).	These	differ-
ent forms of social inequality imply that there is a moral di-






in favour of a more economic and instrumental approach to 
environmental issues. This is unfortunate, because it is pre-
cisely the moral approach to climate change that provides 
promising opportunities for tackling this issue together.
Climate change: the perfect moral storm
Why	 is	 it	 so	 difficult	 to	 convince	 people,	 companies,	 and	
governments that we need to act together now if we want 
to	curb	climate	change?	The	philosopher	Stephen	Gardiner	
suggests that the problem of climate change has a few pe-
culiar	characteristics	that	make	it	difficult	for	people	to	take	
the necessary steps to solve it. He calls it the ‘perfect moral 
storm’, using the analogy of a rare combination of weather 
circumstances referred to as ‘the perfect storm’. While each 
of	the	factors	that	influence	the	climate	itself	constitutes	a	
serious constraint on our ability to take decisions, when they 
occur simultaneously, they create the perfect moral storm. 
In this storm, people, companies, and governments doubt 
whether they should take action to stop climate change and 
what	 that	 action	 should	 be.	More	 specifically,	 this	 perfect	
moral	storm	is	shaped	by	a	combination	of	three	storms:	a	
‘world storm’, a ‘temporal storm’, and a ‘theoretical storm’. 
First, we have the world storm. Climate change is a problem 
that	can	only	be	solved	through	global	cooperation.	Green-
house	 gases	 that	 are	 emitted	 in	one	place	have	 an	 effect	
on the rest of the world. Our environmentally friendly be-
Figure	8 
Inequality in climate change
Top: CO₂ emissions per person 
Bottom: Vulnerability to climate change impact
Source: http://www.skepticalscience.com/graphics.php?g=15
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haviour	can	be	offset	by	CO2 emissions in other countries. 
Behavioural economists see the climate issue as a social di-
lemma, a situation in which people must choose between 
their own interests and the interests of the community. The 
world	as	a	whole	benefits	if	every	individual	and	each	coun-
try reduces its use of fossil fuels, but individual people and 
countries	benefit	the	most	if	others	reduce	their	emissions	
while they themselves continue unabated in their consump-
tion and production.
There is, moreover, great disparity between	countries:	while	
poor	countries	suffer	more	from	climate	change	due	to	their	
geographical	location	(think	of	droughts	and	flooding),	the	
responsibility for climate change lies primarily with the rich-
er Western countries that generated the most emissions in 
the past. But the world lacks a well-functioning system of 
global governance. The poorer countries are in no position 
to force the richer countries to assume their responsibili-
ty, while the richer countries have enough political power 
to choose not to participate in climate treaties. All these 
factors	diminish	the	likelihood	of	finding	a	good,	collective	
solution to the issue of climate change.
Second, there is the temporal storm: climate change is a 
problem postponed. The climate reacts very slowly, which 
means that our behaviour will have disastrous consequenc-
es only in the distant future. Moreover, reducing the use 




mostly	 positive	 effects	 in	 the	 future	 (after	 2050).	 Future	
generations have no voice in the debate on climate change, 
and their interests are not well represented. Psychological 
research	 shows	 that	 most	 people	 already	 find	 it	 difficult	
to postpone rewards for themselves, so you can imagine 
how	difficult	people	find	it	to	do	something	now	to	reward	
the next generation. National governments have a short 
lifespan and are primarily focused on maximizing outcomes 
for their current voters instead of outcomes for future gen-
erations. This is known as ‘contempocentrism’. There is a 
great temptation to pass the buck to the next generation. At 
the same time, scientists warn that if we wait to take action, 
future generations will have to employ much more drastic 
measures to turn the tide than those we would have to em-
ploy now to achieve the same result.
And	finally,	a	theoretical storm is raging. We humans lack the 
intellectual tools truly to understand and tackle the magni-
tude of the climate problem. Scientists assume that a ra-
tional analysis of the climate issue is the way to achieve a 
solution. For example, they approach the debate on climate 
change from a technical perspective (‘How do we reduce 





that individuals and countries can be convinced to act in a 
rational way to solve this collective problem. But all these 
approaches ignore the magnitude and complexity of the cli-
mate issue and the inability of humankind to understand or 
solve a problem of this type. At the same time, debates on 
climate change give people an excuse not to act or to blame 
somebody else. They can also make people unrealistically 
confident	 that	scientists	will	find	a	solution	 to	 the	climate	
problem (described as the technological fix)	or	can	even	lead	
to denial that it is a problem (‘Even the scientists can’t agree 
on	it!’).	If	we	wait	to	take	action	until	it	is	crystal	clear	what	
we should do about climate change, it will be too late.
The combination of the peculiar characteristics of the cli-
mate	problem	(the	world,	temporal,	and	theoretical	storms)	
creates a superstorm that contributes to a new problem, 
namely that of moral corruption. The problem of climate 
change is so big and so complex that it makes it easy for us 
to postpone action. It is easy to do nothing based on the 
argument that we don’t know enough yet about climate 
change to decide how we are going to solve it. By address-
ing only a part of the problem while ignoring other aspects, 
we can easily convey the impression that we are doing our 
best to stop climate change. While climate conferences are 
being convened to try to allocate responsibility for a global 
problem,	 they	can	have	the	effect	of	making	us	 feel	good	
about climate treaties that will have only limited positive 
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effects	on	future	generations.	The	perfect	moral	storm	cre-
ated by climate change makes it easy for the current gener-
ation to go on behaving in a manner that will damage future 
generations without having to feel bad about it.
Instrumental solutions to the climate problem
Many climate scientists agree that in order to stop climate 
change, governments must take drastic collective action as 
soon as possible. At the same time, economists emphasize 
that such measures would bring high costs and that over-
ambitious measures would unnecessarily damage the econ-
omies of individual countries. Citizens and governments are 
dependent on each other to solve the climate problem. But 
acting in the collective interest by reducing our dependency 
on fossil fuels also brings high costs, such as the costs in-
volved in investing in new climate-neutral technologies and 
the income that a country might forgo if the production and 
export of goods declines. These high costs of cooperation 
make it tempting for individual countries to not cooperate 
and to let the problem be solved by other countries. 
When the climate problem is seen as a social dilemma, then 
the logical solution is to arrive at an even distribution of the 
costs through international treaties. One example of this 
is the Kyoto Protocol, a treaty signed by a large number of 
industrialized countries in which the rights to emit green-




Emissions, wastes, and resource depletion all pose 
threats to living organisms, including human beings. 
Because environmental risks do not necessarily ma-
terialize at the place where they originate from, the 
risks and benefits associated with environmental im-
pact are not equally distributed. 
On a local scale, those living in high-poverty and eth-
nic minority groups are the ones often suffering most 
from these environmental risks. They live closest 
to smoke emitting factories, polluting highways or 
waste disposals. These groups are often disadvan-
taged on several other aspects as well, like having 
poor labour conditions, low levels of education, and 
low levels of political participation. 
On a global scale, the unequal distribution of envi-
ronmental risks and benefits associated with these 
risks is equally pressing. The countries that contrib-
ute most to climate change are not the ones that suf-
fer the gravest impact. The average per capita CO2 
emission in the US, for example, is about 16.5 ton and 
that of the European Union is 6.7 ton. But a country 
like Bangladesh, that is extremely vulnerable to cli-
mate change due to the increased risk of flooding, 
has a per capita CO2 emission of only 0.4 ton. 
The term climate justice is often used to refer to these 
global inequalities and the responsibility to take ac-
tion to reduce climate change. There are two main 
arguments that point at affluent countries having 
a responsibility in this regard. First, as mentioned 
above, the causal contribution to climate change by 
affluent countries is much larger than that of poorer 
countries. Second, affluent countries are generally 
better able to take action to reduce climate change.
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distributed. Although these climate treaties can be a good 
first	step	in	the	direction	of	a	reduction	of	CO2 emissions, 
they do have disadvantages. An economic approach to the 
climate problem calls for setting a price for pollution and al-
lowing the market to do its job. The idea is that if the price is 
high enough, companies will of their own accord emit fewer 
greenhouse gases.
But research shows that trade in emissions does not lead 
to a reduction of CO2  emissions because it may reduce in-
vestments in emission-reducing technologies that would 
actually	 reduce	 climate	 change	 (see	 Box	 5.2).	 The	 Kyoto	
Protocol and the emissions trading system of the European 
Union have not led to any form of reduction in emissions to 
date. The trade in emissions creates a short-term focus on 
economic	costs	and	benefits	and	a	diffusion	of	responsibil-
ity, instead of the long-term vision necessary to reduce CO2 
emissions. Such a trading system only leads to a reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions when the maximum allowable 
emission is low. But when establishing the current system, a 
surplus of emissions rights was distributed. As a result, the 
price is very low, making it cheaper for companies to buy 
additional emissions rights than to invest in technology that 
limits these emissions. In addition, many companies current-
ly	have	a	surplus	of	emissions	rights	due	to	the	effects	of	the	
economic	crisis	(as	a	result	of	the	decline	in	production).	
Economic approaches to the climate problem seem simple 
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5.2
Drawbacks of carbon emission 
rights trading
Servaas Storm
The rationale for carbon trading is that a steady pres-
sure from a high carbon price, which internalizes car-
bon’s external cost, will motivate firms and individu-
als to reduce their carbon emissions now and invest 
in efficient carbon-avoiding alternative technologies 
to reduce emissions in the future. But can a ‘correc-
tive’ price for carbon bring about the radical de-car-
bonization of our energy, transportation, production 
and consumption systems, necessary for a zero-car-
bon society? The answer is: No. 
For a start, setting the right ‘corrective’ price for car-
bon is impossible because carbon’s external cost 
(which depends on the future impacts of warming) 
is unknown. Second, climate stabilization requires 
a fundamental ‘disruption’ of hydrocarbon energy 
infrastructures, and a massive upsetting of vested 
interests in the fossil-fuel economy. If the carbon 
price is to incentivize firms to bring about this radical 
change, it has to be high enough to help private firms 
recover their investment costs plus a substantial 
premium for market risks associated with deploy-
ing risky, unproven technologies. Imperfect real-life 
carbon markets are unlikely to produce such a high 
price, but will instead exhibit disproportionate price 
instability. Worse, carbon trading may encourage the 
industries most addicted to fossil fuels to carry on 
much as before, because it is less costly for them to 
purchase carbon credits from others than switch to 
renewable energy. 
Finally, carbon pricing raises serious distributive 
concerns. The reason is that to avoid ‘carbon leak-
age’, the carbon price must be the same for everyone 
everywhere. A high enough global carbon price will 
considerably raise energy prices – one study predicts 
that the price of 1 litre of gasoline will increase by 1 
US$ – and the effect of this on the world’s three bil-
lion poor, who have to survive on less than 2,5 US$ 
per person per day, would be devastating. 
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and rational, but there are also drawbacks, because they 
can lead to greater social inequality in the world. Take, for 
example, the recent growth in the use of biofuels. The use 
of biofuels in our part of the world leads to food crises and 
an increase in food prices in other parts of the world, be-
cause land and crops that had otherwise been used for food 
production are now being used to produce our ‘sustainable’ 
fuel. Similarly, there are disadvantages to emissions trading 
and a high price for fossil fuels, because they enable richer 
countries to buy emissions allowances from poorer coun-
tries, which in turn is likely to hinder production and eco-
nomic growth in poorer parts of the world.
Also with regard to the intergenerational aspect of climate 
change	–	 the	 fact	 that	 future	generations	will	 suffer	more	
from climate change and are dependent on the choices 
we make now – there are drawbacks to a purely econom-
ic approach. When you develop an economic model com-
paring	 the	financial	 costs	and	 the	environmental	benefits,	
then you must weigh the costs of climate measures for the 
present	generation	against	 the	benefits	for	 future	genera-
tions. It is debatable whether these are economic consid-
erations or whether they are in fact moral considerations. 
If you were only concerned with economic outcomes, then 
the balance would quickly come out in favour of the cur-




mate-neutral economy are given too much weight, and they 
do	not	take	sufficient	account	of	the	possible	catastrophic	
consequences of our current behaviour in the future, be-
cause	these	effects	are	still	uncertain.	These	model-based	
approaches cannot cope with uncertainty and thus will not 
stimulate the policy turnaround that is needed to stop cli-
mate change.
At the level of the individual, environmentally-friendly be-
haviour on the part of consumers can be seen as a dilem-
ma	between	self-interest	 (consume	as	much	as	you	want)	
and	the	interest	of	the	community	(tackling	climate	change).	
One instrumental approach to this dilemma would be for 
governments to encourage environmentally-friendly be-




of saving energy. But psychological research shows that 
these economic approaches have a limited positive impact 
on	 consumers.	 Insofar	 as	 financial	 incentives	 encourage	
environmentally-friendly	 behaviour,	 this	 behaviour	 often	
disappears	quickly	once	the	financial	incentive	is	removed.	
Moreover,	 it	 turns	 out	 that	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	 financial	
aspects of decisions displaces other motives that people 






The world’s countries contribute different amounts 
of heat-trapping gasses to the atmosphere. The six 
biggest carbon emitters – China, the U.S.A., the E.U., 
India, Russia and Japan – account for almost 70% 
of annual global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
Heavily reliant on fossil fuels for electricity and steel 
production, China emits nearly twice the amount of 
GHG as the U.S. and while the production-based car-
bon intensity of China’s economy is on a rising trend, 
carbon intensities of the U.S. and the European econ-
omies have been declining for two decades. Hence, it 
is argued that China, and the other ‘emerging econ-
omies’, will determine the fate of global warming, as 
they are ‘responsible’ for most of current and future 
GHG emission growth.
There is more to this picture than meets the eye, 
however. Over the past 25 years, the U.S. and the 
E.U. have relocated or outsourced much of their 
carbon-intensive (manufacturing) activities to new-
ly industrializing countries including China. The rich 
OECD countries have become net carbon importers 
(importing emissions embodied in the manufactured 
goods ‘made in China’). This means that part of the 
(rising) carbon emissions in China and other emerg-
ing economies arise in the production of goods, ex-
ported to and consumed by the U.S. and E.U. Empir-
ical evidence on consumption-based CO2 emissions 
(which include all carbon emissions associated with 
consumption, production and transportation of com-
modities along internationally fragmented global 
commodity chains) shows that carbon intensities of 
U.S. and E.U. consumption has been steadily increas-
ing until now. Carbon responsibility is different when 
defined in terms of consumption. 
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manner. Suppose you are about to buy a new car, and you 
are	 considering	 buying	 a	 fuel-efficient	 car	 because	 you	
think it is important to do your bit for the environment. It 
turns out that the government has introduced various tax 
breaks for buying a hybrid car. You end up buying an ener-
gy-efficient	car,	but	you’re	no	longer	sure	whether	you	did	
so because you believe in the importance of environmen-
tally-friendly	behaviour	(an	intrinsic	motivation)	or	because	
of	 the	financial	benefits	 (an	extrinsic	motivation).	Chances	
are that this experience will undermine future environmen-
tal behaviour, because your intrinsic motivation has been 
partly transformed into an extrinsic motivation. The greater 
the	extrinsic	reasons	for	buying	a	hybrid	car	–	tax	benefits	
as opposed to environmental considerations – the less you 
will be inclined to take the trouble to run the car on electric-
ity	instead	of	gasoline.	And	when	all	of	the	financial	incen-
tives for buying an environmentally-friendly car have dis-
appeared (which is a real prospect, given the variability of 
government	policy),	it	is	likely	that	economic	considerations	
will supersede environmental considerations, meaning that 
people	choose	cheap	instead	of	fuel-efficient	cars.
Economic and instrumental solutions to climate change 
thus have their limitations. How, then, could a moral per-
spective contribute to solving this problem?
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Moral dimensions of the climate issue
As with the other three social themes in this book, scientists 
involved in the climate debate are also increasingly begin-
ning to stress the importance of moral considerations in the 
search for solutions. Several philosophers and economists 
have pointed out the limitations of instrumental approach-
es in solving the climate problem. Their main argument is 
that we can no longer walk away from our responsibility to-
wards future generations and social inequality in the world. 
And economic approaches do not really lead to a collec-
tive solution that works for poor countries and for future 
generations. A uniform distribution across countries of the 
costs of solving the problem of climate change would lead 
to greater social inequality and is therefore untenable. A tax 
on greenhouse gas emissions could easily be borne by rich-
er countries, but would hold back the economic develop-
ment of poorer countries. Moreover, whereas rich Western 
countries such as the US and Western European countries 
appear to be reducing their emissions, they are in fact out-
sourcing their production to countries with growing econ-
omies	(such	as	China	and	India)	while	their	own	consump-
tion	only	 continues	 to	grow	 (see	Box	5.3).	Thus,	 although	
one collective solution might appear to be the allocation of 
environmental measures, in practice this is not the case. In 
the transition to a climate-neutral world, we must not think 
in terms of a uniform distribution, but rather in terms of a 
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fair distribution of the costs.
More and more scientists are beginning to contend that if 
we want to reach a workable collective solution to envi-
ronmental issues, we need to take a moral approach. One 
example of such an ethical approach is the Greenhouse 
Developments Rights Framework proposed by various en-
vironmental economists. The bottom line of this proposal 
is that the world’s poor should be exempted from the costs 
entailed in solving the climate problem. The framework is 
premised on notions of responsibility and capability, both 
of which are determined on the basis of a threshold level of 
development. People who live below this threshold should 
be allowed to focus mainly on surviving and developing, for 
they bear little historical responsibility for climate change 
and should not have to bear the burden of solving this prob-
lem. The responsibility must be borne by the people with 
incomes above the threshold, regardless of the country in 
which	they	live.	This	approach	leads	to	a	completely	differ-
ent distribution of the costs of climate change – a division 
in which richer countries that currently emit fewer green-
house gases than emerging economies such as China and 
India are held responsible for solving the climate problem.
The intergenerational aspect of climate change also com-
pels us to take a moral approach. For the present genera-
tion, it is very advantageous and easy to pass on to the next 
generation the responsibility for solving the problems that 
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Few people are willing to significantly adapt their 
lifestyle in order to reduce their ecological footprint. 
Several scholars have proposed that the missing link 
in communication about climate change is the role 
of emotions in enticing a lifestyle that diminishes cli-
mate change. Emotions may affect people’s environ-
mental behaviour in two ways: They lead to great-
er awareness of the problems, and they increase 
people’s motivation to do something about climate 
change. Yet, emotions are generally excluded from 
communication and political decision-making about 
risky technologies and climate change, because of 
the assumption that emotions are irrational and mis-
leading.
However, this assumption is based on a narrow 
understanding of emotions that is challenged by in-
sights from emotion researchers who emphasize that 
emotions can be an important source of practical ra-
tionality and moral insight. Quantitative approaches 
to risk only look at net outcomes at a high level of ag-
gregation; they do not look into other ethical issues 
such as justice, fairness, autonomy and equality. In 
my research I argue that emotions such as sympathy, 
compassion, indignation, and feelings of responsi-
bility can more strongly draw our attention to such 
moral values. For example, by providing people with 
concrete narratives of those who undergo the effects 
of climate change, distant others who can otherwise 
easily be neglected come uncomfortably close, which 
can elicit compassion, and force people to critically 
assess their own behaviour. Furthermore, the experi-
ence of moral emotions more strongly enhances peo-
ple’s motivation to act than purely rational, abstract 
knowledge about climate change, even if it means 
that we have to make personal sacrifices, such as 
adjusting our lifestyle. Communication about climate 
change should appeal to reflective moral emotions 
such as sympathy and compassion, as these can give 
rise to critical ethical reflection and motivate us to act 
in a sustainable way.
5.4




climate change will cause. Moreover, the temporal nature 
of our current institutions (governance at the national and 
international	 levels)	and	their	 focus	on	the	present	gener-
ation make them ill-equipped to deal with climate change. 
While an economic approach to the problem automatically 
emphasizes	the	high	costs	and	low	benefits	for	the	current	
generation, a moral approach can lead to a long-term per-
spective and a sense of responsibility for the future. One 
proposal,	 by	 the	 above-mentioned	 philosopher	 Gardiner,	
calls for the establishment of a global constitutional institu-
tion that would function as the voice of future generations. 
This constitutional institution must explicitly address the 
impact of current policies on future generations in order to 
minimize	the	effect	of	moral	corruption	in	the	decisions	tak-
en by the current generation.
In	 the	field	of	psychology	as	well,	a	number	of	studies	on	
environmental behaviour show that morality rather than 
financial	gain	can	be	a	powerful	incentive	for	environmen-
tally-friendly behaviour. Environmental campaigns that pro-





chapters, the underlying reason is that people consider it 
very important to be moral individuals, as a result of which 
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they are more motivated to engage in behaviour that stress-
es	their	morality	than	behaviour	that	results	in	financial	gain.	
Indeed, the emotions that are evoked when we think about 
morality, such as compassion and indignation, turn out to be 
strong	predictors	of	motivation	(see	Box	5.4).
Another way to highlight the importance of morality and 
thereby to motivate environmental behaviour is to encourage 
people to think about their legacy and how they want to be 
remembered by others. This ensures that long-term goals are 
given more priority and that concern for others in the future 
(such	as	children	and	grandchildren)	becomes	an	 important	
motive behind people’s choices. Research shows that people 
who think about their legacy donate more money to charities 
dedicated to the environment, are more motivated to combat 
climate change, and also come to believe more strongly that 
climate change is a reality that needs to be addressed.
And	finally,	from	a	global	perspective,	it	turns	out	that	mo-
rality motivates people to stand behind ambitious environ-
mental policies. A worldwide study has shown that people 
consider it more important to do something about climate 
change once they realize that not only is this kind of policy 
good for the environment, but that it also says something 
about the society in which we live. If people realize that a so-
ciety that cares about the environment is a society that has 
more morally upright and engaged people, they will also be 




To confront the climate problem, the current generation 
of world citizens must take action quickly as a collective to 
curb the use of fossil fuels. Although economic approaches 
to encourage environmentally-friendly behaviour such as 
cost-benefit	 analyses,	 emissions	 trading	 systems,	 and	 fi-
nancial incentives appear	 to	be	effective	approaches,	 they	
divert us from the scale and magnitude of the problem and 
only motivate people and politicians to think about achiev-
ing the greatest gains, rather than taking collective respon-
sibility. A moral approach to the climate problem would lead 
to	more	effective	solutions,	because	it	would	motivate	peo-
ple and countries to look for real solutions that would actu-
ally mitigate the climate problem and the social inequality 
that results from it. 
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